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Criminal Law
by Frank C. Mills, III*

I. INTRODUCTION
In the hundreds of cases reviewed for this survey, there were few earthshaking decisions. DNA evidence has arrived in Georgia,' and the yearand-a-day rule has left.2 Nevertheless, there are more noteworthy cases
than can be adequately addressed in this survey. There are plenty of pitfalls for the unwary. In fact the most notable trend is the ever-increasing
number of challenges to former counsel. Prosecutors, defense counsel, and
courts are well-advised to use the Checklist for Unified Appeals as a guide
in any criminal case.
Due to the significance of the Checklist for Unified Appeal, the author
uses a format similar to that of previous authors of this survey, but the
format of the section on procedure has been changed to correspond
roughly to the Checklist for Unified Appeal. The author does not fancy
himself a scholar, but a "nuts and bolts" person. Hopefully this survey
will be scholarly enough in content, if not in style, to be of interest to law
students and members of the bar and bench, who slug it out daily in the
"trenches:" the criminal trial courts of this state.
* Chief Judge of the Cherokee and Forsyth Superior Courts, Blue Ridge Judicial Circuit.
Emory University (B.A., 1970); University of Georgia (J.D., 1973). Member, State Bar of
Georgia. Member, Pattern-Jury Instruction Committee.
The Author expresses gratitude to his law clerk, Bonnie M. Baer (Tulane University, B.A.,

1985; Emory University, J.D., 1988) for her able assistance, and to the following law students for research support: Benjamin L. Bagwell from the University of Georgia; Jennifer

M. Crain, Tally Frankel, and Betsy Roberson from Emory University; and Douglas L. Kirkland from Mercer University. I am also deeply indebted to Marilyn Maxwell for her assistance above and beyond the call of duty.
1.

See infra notes 544-50 and accompanying text.

2. See infra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 537 and accompanying text; see also GA. Sup. CT. RuLzS (1991).
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SUBSTANTIVE CRIMES AND RELATED ISSUES

A. ConstitutionalChallenges
Free Speech. Masks are out; bumper stickers are in. In what were
probably the two most highly publicized constitutional challenges of the
year, Georgia's Anti-Mask Act 4 (the "Act") was upheld,5 and its bumper
sticker law6 was struck down.' Both cases dealt with the First Amendment right of free speech and other challenges.
In State v. Miller,$ the trial court sustained Miller's challenge to the
Act s before trial, and the state appealed. In a lengthy opinion, the supreme court reversed the trial court and held that wearing a mask was
not "immune from governmental regulation ...if the regulation furthers

a substantial governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and the incidental restriction on First Amendment
freedom is no greater than necessary to further the governmental interest." 10 The Georgia Supreme Court held that the Act is "content-neutral"
and that "the statute's incidental restriction on freedom of expression" is
de minimis." The court further held that the statute, when read with the
Statement of Public Policy, 1 is neither unconstitutionally vague nor
O.C.G.A. § 16-11-38 (1988).
State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 398 S.E.2d 547 (1990).

4.
5.

6. O.C.G.A. § 40-1-4 (1989).
7. Cunningham v. State, 260 Ga. 827, 400 S.E.2d 916 (1991).
8.

260 Ga. 669, 398 S.E.2d 547 (1990).

9. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-38(a) and (b) (1988) provide:
(a) A person is guilty of a misdemeanor when he wears a mask, hood, or device
by which any portion of the face is so hidden, concealed, or covered as to conceal
the identity of the wearer and is upon any public way or public property or upon
the private property of another without the written permission of the owner or
occupier of the property to do so.
(b) This Code section shall not apply to:
(1) A person wearing a traditional holiday costume on the occasion of the
holiday.

(2) [Occupational or athletic safety masks];
(3) A person using a mask in a theatrical production including use in
Mardi gras celebrations and masquerade balls; or
(4) A person wearing a gas mask ... in... drills and... emergencies.
O.C.G.A. § 16-11-38(a), (b) (1988). The Act also included a Statement of Public Policy. 1951
Ga. Laws 9 § 1.
10. 260 Ga. at 671, 398 S.E.2d at 550 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376

(1968)).
11.

Id. at 673, 398 S.E.2d at 551.

12.

1951 Ga. Laws 9 provides:
All persons residing in the State are entitled to the equal protection of their
lives and property.
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overbroad."5 Moreover, the court found that the Act did not violate
Miller's right to freedom of association. Though the courts have protected
1
anonymity in the distribution of hand bills and pamphlets, ' "the statute's effect on the Klan's [Miller's] ability to advocate. . . anonymously
is negligible." 15
Finally, the court held that the Act did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Miller also challenged the
Act as a violation of the right of free speech under the Georgia Constitution, and the supreme court opined without citation of authorities that
"[tlhe 1983 Constitution of Georgia provides even broader protection"
than the First Amendment.17 The Georgia Constitution is not otherwise
addressed in the opinion.
"S
HAPPENS." You know what I mean. This now familiar bit of
nastiness led to a $100 fine and the appeal in Cunningham v. State' s
when the expression appeared in the form of a bumper sticker on Cunningham's car. In 1988 the Georgia General Assembly enacted a law to
prohibit such conduct." The bumper sticker law underwent an analysis
0 The supreme court noted
similar to that of the Anti-Mask Act in Miller."
that profane words could only be regulated in the context of "fighting
words" or to "protect a captive audience or minors. ' '3 Georgia's Bumper
Sticker Law "reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected
speech" and therefore violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments.2
The court further held that the statute was overbroad and vague and that
in order to salvage the statute, the court would have to "excise the prohiThe law protects all, not only against actual physical violence but also against
threats and intimidations from any person or group of persons.
The General Assembly cannot permit persons known or unknown to issue either
actual or implied threats, against other persons in the State.
Persons in this State are and shall continue to .be answerable only to the established law as enforced by legally appointed officers.
1951 Ga. Laws 9 § 1.
13. 260 Ga. at 674, 398 S.E.2d at 551-52.
14. Id. at 675, 398 S.E.2d at 552 (citing Talley v. California, 362 U.S 60 (1960)).
15. Id., 398 S.E.2d at 553.
16. Id. at 676, 398 S.E.2d at 553.
17. Id. at 671, 398 S.E.2d at 550. As an interesting aside, a jury in Gwinnett State Court
acquitted Miller on September 18, 1991. State v. Miller, No. 90-D-929-2 (Sept. 18, 1991).
18. 260 Ga. 827, 400 S.E.2d 916 (1991).
19. O.C.G.A. § 40-1-4 (1991) provides: "No person owning, operating, or using a motor
vehicle in this state shall knowingly affix or attach to any part of such motor vehicle any
sticker, decal,. . . containing profane or lewd words describing sexual acts, excretory functions, or parts of the human body." Id. "Violation of this provision is a misdemeanor with
fine not to exceed $100." Id.
20. 260 Ga. 669, 398 S.E.2d 547 (1990).
21. 260 Ga. at 831, 400 S.E.2d at 920.
22. Id.
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bition of profane words" and "equate lewd with obscene. '23 Based on
Webster's International Dictionary and Georgia's law prohibiting the
distribution of obscene materials, 2 the court found the statute
unsalvageable."
Traffic Laws. Georgia's Habitual Violator law26 was one of several
traffic laws that survived constitutional challenge. In a rather unusual
equal protection challenge, the court in Gaines v. State27 held that rendering a habitual violator guilty of a felony if he operates a vehicle on
private or public property," while holding a driver with a suspended license guilty of a misdemeanor only when he operates a vehicle on a public highway, was not a violation of equal protection .2 The court found
that the Georgia General Assembly could have reasonably concluded that
habitual violators are more dangerous than those who merely have had
their licenses suspended; therefore, Gaines failed to show that the classification was arbitrary and not related to the objective of the statute. 0
The presumptions of intoxication set out in Official Code of Georgia
Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 40-6-392(b)(3) 1 were attacked in Lat23. Id. at 832, 400 S.E.2d at 920.
24. O.C.G.A. § 16-12-80 (1988).
25. 260 Ga. at 832-33 n.1, 400 S.E.2d at 921 n.1. Noting that the court removed the
ability of the state to proscribe this bumper sticker, Justice Clarke indulged in a bit of social
commentary, quoting Benjamin Franklin: "Everything one has a right to do is not best to be
done" and "(tihe exhibition of poor taste and demonstration of lack of concern for the sensibilities of others cast the offender in a position of societal disrespect. This position is well
deserved." Id.
26. O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58(c) (1991).
27. 260 Ga. 267, 392 S.E.2d 524 (1990).
28. O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58(c) (1991) provides: "lilt shall be unlawful for any person to operate any motor vehicle in this state after such person has received notice that his driver's
license has been revoked as provided in subsection (b) .. . [Habitual Violator Revocation]
...if such person has not thereafter obtained a valid driver's license." Id. (emphasis

added).
29. 260 Ga. at 268, 392 S.E.2d at 525. O.C.G.A. § 40-5-121(a) (1991) provides: "[A]ny
person who drives a motor vehicle on any public highway of this state at a time when his
privilege to do so is suspended ...

shall be guilty of a misdemeanor ...

."

Id. (emphasis

added).
30. 260 Ga. at 268, 392 S.E.2d at 525.
31. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-392(b)(3) (1991) provides:
(b) [U]pon the trial of any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of
acts alleged to have been committed by any person in violation of Code Section
40-6-391, the amount of alcohol in the person's blood at the time alleged, as shown
by chemical analysis of the person's blood, urine, breath, or other bodily substance, shall give rise to the following presumptions:
(3) If there was at that time an alcohol concentration of 0.08 grams or
more, it shall be presumed that the person was under the influence of alco-
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tarulo v. State.2 In Lattarulo defendant claimed that the presumptions
were burden-shifting. The court held that the challenged provision, "although it is worded in terms of a presumption, actually has the effect of
defining the level of blood-alcohol that is sufficient to permit an inference
that the driver is 'under the influence.' "a The court further noted that,
based on appellate court precedents, "the statute may not be charged to
Therefore, the statute does not
the jury using the word 'presumption.' ,,s,
create an unconstitutional presumption."5
Vagueness. If a statute "conveys sufficiently definite warning as to
the proscribed conduct 'when measured by common understanding and
practices,"" it is not unconstitutionally vague. 7 The supreme court, in
Cleveland v. State,s8 held that O.C.G.A. section 42-5-37(a),8 which prohibits a warden from profiting from inmate labor, meets the vagueness
test and therefore is constitutional.' 0 The prohibited interest is clearly a
personal interest or benefit from inmate labor and not the permissible
interest in the inmates' performance of labor that will benefit the county
or state.'1
. Applying the same vagueness test, the supreme court in Satterfield v.
State'2 found O.C.G.A. section 16-11-39(3) to be unconstitutionally
vague.' This statute makes it a misdemeanor to engage "in indecent or
disorderly conduct in the presence of another in any public place.'"" The
phrase "indecent or disorderly conduct" is not defined and provides no
hol, as prohibited by paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (a) of Code
Section 40-6-391 ....
Id. The statute was amended in 1991 to change the concentration requirement to .08. Previously it was .10. See 1991 Ga. Laws 1886, 1894 § 10(b)(3).
32. 261 Ga. 124, 401 S.E.2d 516 (1991).
33. Id. at 125, 401 S.E.2d at 518.
34. Id. (citing Simon v. State, 182 Ga. App. 216, 355 S.E.2d 120 (1987); Peters v. State,
175 Ga. App. 463, 333 S.E.2d 436 (1985)).
35. Id.
36. Cleveland v. State, 260 Ga. 770, 771, 399 S.E.2d 472, 473 (1991) (quoting Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957)).
37. Id.
38. 260 Ga. 770, 399 S.E.2d 472 (1991).
39. O.C.G.A. § 42-5-37(a) (1991) provides: "No warden... who has charge, control, or
direction of inmates shall be interested in any manner whatever in the work or profit of the
labor of any inmate... ." Id.
40. 260 Ga. at 772, 399 S.E.2d at 473.
41. Id.
42. 260 Ga. 427, 395 S.E.2d 816 (1990).
43. Id. at 428, 395 S.E.2d at 817. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39(3) (1988) provides: "A person who
commits any of the following acts commits a misdemeanor: ... (3) Engages in indecent or
disorderly conduct in the presence of another in any public place .... " Id.
44. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39(3) (1988).
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"fair warning to persons of ordinary intelligence as to what [the statute]
prohibits so that they may act accordingly."' 4s By comparison, O.C.G.A.
section 16-6-8,"' which prohibits public indecency, defines such acts as
sexual intercourse and exposure of sexual organs. 47 Although child molestation is defined"' in similar terms as an "immoral and indecent act," it
has been upheld against similar vagueness challenges."
Sentencing. Previously, while upholding Georgia's sodomy law, five
United States Supreme Court Justices expressed concern that the Georgia Sodomy Statute might present an Eighth Amendment 0 problem.' 1
Thereafter, Georgia's Supreme Court upheld a less than maximum sentence (ten years to serve, followed by ten years on probation) for a sodomy conviction.52 In Rodgers v. State,68 the supreme court refused to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature, declined to review the
proportionality of sentences (which is appropriate only in death penalty
cases),"1 and held that a sentence of twenty years for a sodomy conviction
did not shock the conscience and therefore was not cruel and unusual."
All the justices concurred.
In Tiliman v. State," the supreme court upheld the trial court's decision to impose life imprisonment for a second conviction of possession of
45. 260 Ga. at 428, 395 S.E.2d at 817.
46. O.C.G.A. § 16-6-8(a) (Supp. 1991) provides in part:
(a) A person commits the offense of public indecency when he or she performs
any of the following acts in a public place:
(1) An act of sexual intercourse;
(2) A lewd exposure of the sexual organs;
(3) A lewd appearance in a state of partial or complete nudity; or
(4) A lewd caress or indecent fondling of the body of another person.
Id.
47. 260 Ga. at 428 n.1, 395 S.E.2d at 816 n.1.
48. O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a) (1988) provides: "A person commits the offense of child molestation when he does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child
under the age of 14 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the
child or the person." Id.
49. McCord v. State, 248 Ga.765, 285 S.E.2d 724 (1982).
50. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
51. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the United States Supreme Court denied a Due Process Clause challenge to Georgia's sodomy law. Justice Powell concurred.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, dissented with all five
expressing Eighth Amendment concerns. Id. at 196, 199.
52. Gordon v. State, 257 Ga. 439, 360 S.E.2d 253 (1987); see also Ray v. State, 259 Ga.
868, 389 S.E.2d 326 (1990).
53. 261 Ga. 33, 401 S.E.2d 735 (1991).
54. Id. at 37, 401 S.E.2d at 738.
55. Id. at 36, 401 S.E.2d at 737.
56. 260 Ga. 801, 400 S.E.2d 632 (1991).
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cocaine with intent to distribute, 7 as opposed to a potential maximum
sentence of thirty years for trafficking cocaine.58 Even though there were
no more than 0.3 grams, the court held that the trial court did not employ
an irrational statutory sentencing scheme. 9 Therefore, due process and
equal protection rights were not violated. The General Assembly, suggested the court, may have perceived repeated possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute to be a greater threat than the mere possession of
large amounts. 0 In Edwards v. State," the same sentencing provision
withstood an equal protection and due process challenge that alleged that
not all second drug sale convictions receive such a sentence.
Miscellaneous. In Sims v. State,12 the supreme court held that child
molesters were not denied equal protection or due process merely because
children, not permitted to testify in a civil case, could testify against
them." Therefore, Georgia's "molested child witness" exception" to the
requirement that a witness "understand the meaning of an oath" is constitutional. A witness has no fundamental right to testify, and the legislature may set threshold requirements for a witness who wishes to testify. s5
The legislature may also except witnesses under appropriate
circumstances.se
7 which was a weak attempt at a constiThe court in Murphy v. State,6
tutional challenge, held that Murphy's equal protection rights were not
violated when he was prosecuted and convicted for incest and child molestation. 6 Murphy claimed several other persons were engaging in sexual
intercourse with his daughter. They were not prosecuted, nor was his
Id. at 801, 400 S.E.2d at 632.
O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(f) (Supp. 1991).
260 Ga. at 801, 400 S.E.2d at 632.
Id. at 802, 400 S.E.2d at 632-33.
260 Ga. 121, 390 S.E.2d 580 (1990).
260 Ga. 782, 399 S.E.2d 924 (1991).
Id. at 783, 399 S.E.2d at 926.
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-5(a), (b) (Supp. 1991) provide:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this Code section, persons who do
not have the use of reason, such as idiots, lunatics during lunacy, and children
who do not understand the nature of an oath, shall be incompetent witnesses.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this Code section,. . . in
criminal cases involving child molestation, and in all other criminal cases in which
a child was a victim of or a witness to any crime, any such child shall be competent to testify, and his credibility shall be determined as provided in Article 4 of
this chapter.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
65. Id. § 24-9-5(a).
66. Id. § 24-9-5(b).
67. 195 Ga. App. 878, 395 S.E.2d 76 (1990).
68. Id. at 879, 395 S.E.2d at 77.
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daughter, for fornication. Murphy failed even to allege that he was prosecuted on the basis of some unjustifiable standard founded on intentional
and purposeful discrimination.6 '
B. Offenses Defined
Felony Murder. The felony murder law in Georgia does not include
any limitations as to which felonies may support a conviction for felony
murder." In Georgia the courts have long held that a felony murder conviction can be supported by the integrally related felony of aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon71 and even nondangerous felonies like possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. In Baker v. State,7 the merger
doctrine and the nondangerous felony aspect of Georgia's felony murder
rule were discussed at length. Partly because Georgia has no negligent or
reckless homicide statute, the court in Baker rejected the merger doctrine
espoused by some states and held that felony murder could be predicated
upon any felony; otherwise, many homicides would go unpunished.' 4 In a
special concurrence in Johnson v. State," Justice Hunt had previously
declared his misgivings about the applicability of the felony murder rule
in status offenses such as possession of a firearm by a convicted felon."
The court in Lewis v. State" upheld a felony murder conviction predicated upon an integral aggravated assault.7 8 The case was unremarkable
except for a footnote in which Justice Hunt criticized the court's rationale
in Baker for rejecting the merger doctrine as "hardly grounded in logic." 7
One reason given for this criticism was that "such killings can never be
reduced, on the ground of mitigation, to manslaughter."80 In another footnote in Towns o. State,'1 Justice Hunt compared the felony murder in
69. Id. at 878, 395 S.E.2d at 76.
70. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(c) (1988) provides: "A person also commits... murder when, in
the commission of a felony, he causes the death of another human being irrespective of
malice." Id.
71. See, e.g., Cain v. State, 232 Ga. 804, 209 S.E.2d 158 (1974).
72. See, e.g., Scott v. State, 250 Ga. 195, 297 S.E.2d 18 (1982).
73. 236 Ga. 754, 225 S.E.2d 269 (1976).
74. Id. at 757-58, 225 S.E.2d at 271-72.
75. 258 Ga. 856, 376 S.E.2d 356 (1989).
76. Id. at 859-60, 376 S.E.2d at 359-60 (Hunt, J., concurring).
77. 260 Ga. 404, 396 S.E.2d 212 (1990).
78. Id. at 405, 396 S.E.2d at 213.
79. Id. at 405 n.2, 396 S.E.2d at 213 n.2.
80. Id. But see Malone v. State, 238 Ga. 251, 252, 232 S.E.2d 907, 908 (1977), in which
the court held that "because an act done in passion involves a less culpable mental state
than the state of real or imputed malice which is the foundation of the felony murder rule
...where the facts warrant it, a charge on voluntary manslaughter may indeed be given in
a felony murder trial." Id. (emphasis added).
81. 260 Ga. 423, 396 S.E.2d 215 (1990).
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Towns, predicated upon an aggravated assault on a third party, to that in
Lewis. He found the application of the felony murder rule in Towns
"proper" but "unnecessary" in Lewis because the facts there were suffi2
cient for malice murder.
In Byrer v. State,""Justice Hunt again affirmed a conviction of felony
murder, this time based upon a predicate offense of cruelty to a child.8
Cruelty to a child merged into the greater offense of felony murder, but
the doctrine of merger was not an issue on appeal.1" Justice Hunt did
note, however, the particularly gruesome nature of the wounds the child
received." Perhaps Justice Hunt's enthusiasm for the doctrine of merger
was tempered by the realization that if the doctrine were adopted, cases
of cruelty to a child resulting in the death of the victim, such as in Byrer
and Arnett v. State,87 wherein the actual intent to kill may be difficult to
prove, would not be susceptible to any type of homicide prosecution in
Georgia.
In any event, Justice Weltner, recognizing the problems with existing
law and noting that the remedy should lie with the General Assembly,
upheld a similar felony murder conviction in Sumpter v. State,"s which
was predicated on aggravated assault. Furthermore, in King v. State,"
Justice Hunt, writing for a unanimous court, affirmed a felony murder
conviction predicated upon aggravated assault" with one last note about
the merger doctrine.9 1 Interestingly enough, in King Justice Hunt realized
that felony murder is reducible to voluntary manslaughter," thereby solving a concern that caused him to espouse the merger doctrine.
Finally, in Rainwater v. State,"s the court affirmed a conviction for fel-ony murder predicated in part on possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon." There was no mention of status offenses, and the justices specifi82. Id. at 424 n.2, 396 S.E.2d at 217 n.2.
83. 260 Ga. 484, 397 S.E.2d 120 (1990).
84. Id. at 487, 397 S.E.2d at 122.
85. Id. at 484, 397 S.E.2d at 120-21.
86. Id. at 486 & n.4, 397 S.E.2d at 122 & n.4.
87. 245 Ga. 470, 265 S.E.2d 771 (1980).
88. 260 Ga. 683, 398 S.E.2d 12 (1990).
89. 260 Ga. 740, 399 S.E.2d 198 (1991).
90. Id. at 741, 399 S.E.2d at 198.
91. Id. at 741 n.2, 399 S.E.2d at 199 n.2.
92. Id. at 741, 399 S.E.2d at 199. Justice Hunt wrote that voluntary manslaughter was a
lesser included offense of felony murder and that the jury would have been authorized to
convict the defendant for voluntary manslaughter "if they found the defendant acted as the
result of an irresistible passion while committing an aggravated assault on [the victim], resulting in [the victim's] death." Id.
93. 260 Ga. 807, 400 S.E.2d 612 (1991).
94. Id. at 808, 400 S.E.2d at 625.
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cally declined to adopt the position espoused in Justice Hunt's special
concurrence in Johnson.v. State.0 All the justices concurred.' 6
What is the upshot of all this? At least some of the justices do not like
felony murders predicated on integral felonies like aggravated assault on
the same victim or upon nondangerous or status offenses. The rule in
Baker97 appears to be safe for now, until and unless the General Assembly enacts a negligent or reckless homicide statute. This is significant for
two reasons. First a major portion of all murders on appeal this year included felony murder counts. Prosecutors appear to use this tactic because it alleviates the difficult-to-prove element of the specific intent to
kill. Second, while several cases hold that it is not error for the Court to
give a voluntary manslaughter charge on a felony murder indictment, 98
none hold that it would be error for the court to fail to give such a charge
if requested by the defense. Based on the previous discussion and the
holdings of King," State v. Stonaker,10 and State v.Alvarado,"' the
court will probably find error when the trial judge fails to give such a
charge if properly requested.
In an unrelated felony murder ruling, the supreme court in State v.
Cross'02 held that in order to constitute felony murder, the death need
not occur during the felony, but only that the death be caused by an
injury that occurred during the res gestae of the felony.10 3
Finally, in Heard v. State,' 4 Justice Hunt held that the defense of justification in defense of self is applicable in felony murder cases "regardless of the felony specified by the state as the underlying felony."' 0' Furthermore, even if guilty of an underlying "status offense" felony, an
individual defendant is not precluded from asserting self defense.' 0'

95.
96.
97.
98.
S.E.2d
99.
100.
101.

258 Ga. 856, 859-60, 376 S.E.2d 356, 359-60 (1989).
260 Ga. at 807, 376 S.E.2d at 356.
236 Ga. 754, 225 S.E.2d 269 (1976).
King v. State, 260 Ga. 740, 399 S.E.2d 198 (1991); Malone v. State, 238 Ga. 251, 232
907 (1977); Young v. State, 141 Ga. App. 261, 233 S.E.2d 221 (1977).
260 Ga. 740, 399 S.E.2d 198 (1991).
236 Ga. 1, 222 S.E.2d 354, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976).
260 Ga. 563, 397 S.E.2d 550 (1990).

102. 260 Ga. 845, 401 S.E.2d 510 (1991).
103. Id. at 847, 401 S.E.2d at 512.
104. 261 Ga. 262, 403 S.E.2d 438 (1991).

105. Id. at 264, 403 S.E.2d at 439.
106. Id.
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O.C.G.A. section 16-3-21(b)(2) 10 7 does not preclude such a defense and
previous cases to the contrary are overruled.108
Other Homicide and Assault Rulings. In one of the most publicized opinions of the year, the supreme court ruled in State v. Cross 0'"
that the year-and-a-day rule, which evolved from English common law,110
previously adopted in Georgia,11 was abolished with the adoption of the
1968 Criminal Code,113 despite dicta to the contrary in Manning v.
State.'1 Justice Benham, in a strong dissent,1 ' noted that the year-anda-day rule is archaic and should be abolished due to advances in the medical field, but disagreed that the legislature abolished the rule with enactment of the 1968 Criminal Code."1 He further noted that since the rule
was judicially created, it could and should be judicially abolished in the
case then being considered."' However, such ruling could only be11pro7
spective, and, therefore, could not salvage the prosecution of Cross.
Is intent to kill a defense to involuntary manslaughter? This seemingly
absurd and dangerous idea appears to be the inadvertent holding of
Byrer v. State.116 Byrer concerned a felony murder conviction in which
the victim, a child, died from multiple blows. Defendant requested a
charge on involuntary manslaughter because the initial blow might have
caused the death of the child. The trial court refused. 11' While the request to charge was oral, the supreme court reached the merits and held
that a charge on involuntary manslaughter was not required because "[tlo
warrant instructions on involuntary manslaughter. . . there must be evidence to authorize a determination that death occurred unintentionally
107. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(b)(2) (1988) provides: "A person is not justified in using force
under the circumstances specified in subsection (a) of this Code section if he . . . [i]s attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commission or attempted commission
of a felony . . . ." Id.
108. Hall v. State, 259 Ga. 243, 378 S.E.2d 860 (1989) and Ely v. State, 244 Ga. 432, 260
S.E.2d 345 (1989), are expressly overruled by 261 Ga. at 263, 403 S.E.2d at 439 (Weltner, J.,

dissenting in part).
109. 260 Ga. 845, 401 S.E.2d 510 (1991) (codified by the General Assembly in 1991 at
O.C.G.A. § 16-5-4 (1991)).

110.
[a year
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

13 Ruling Case Law § 208 (1916). "(W]hen death does not ensue within such time
and a day] the law presumes that it proceeded from some other cause." Id.
Head v. State, 68 Ga. App. 759, 24 S.E.2d 145 (1943).
1968 Ga. Laws 1249.
123 Ga. App. 844, 182 S.E.2d 690 (1971).
260 Ga. 845, 847, 401 S.E.2d 510, 512 (1991) (Benham, J., dissenting).
Id. at 848, 401 S.E.2d at 512-13 (Benham, J., dissenting).

116. Id. at 848-49, 401 S.E.2d at 512-13 (Benham, J., dissenting).
117.

Id. (Benham, J., dissenting).

118.

260 Ga. 484, 397 S.E.2d 120 (1990).

119.

Id. at 484-85, 397 S.E.2d at 120-21.
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from the commission of an unlawful act other than a felony. ' 120 Thus, the
court treats the code language "without any intention to do so"12 as an
element of the offense which must be proven before an individual can be
convicted of involuntary manslaughter. If that is the case, then in a different set of circumstances, a defendant charged with involuntary manslaughter can take the stand, defend his case, and receive a directed verdict by merely stating "I meant to kill the little so and so." This was
clearly not intended by the General Assembly. Rather, the language
"without any intention to do so" should be seen as analogous to the language "irrespective of malice"122 in felony murder. The issue of intent
thus becomes irrelevant. The charge on involuntary manslaughter in
Byrer,12 if not waived by the oral request, should have been given.124
Having previously tested positive for the AIDS (HIV) virus, defendant
28
in Scroggins v. State1
was charged with aggravated assault with intent
6
to murder'2 after biting an officer. The appeals court held that the evidence supported the verdict,2 7 that the court could preclude defendant
from subpoenaing expert witnesses who would have cast doubt on
whether the virus could have been so transmitted,'28 and that the State
was not required to prove that the bite was a deadly weapon.' 2' The court
held that "[ilt is no defense to a charge of criminal attempt that the
crime the accused is charged with attempting was, under the attendant
circumstances, factually or legally impossible of commission if such crime
could have been committed had the attendant circumstancesbeen as the
accused believed them to be."' s0 The defense of impossibility "is even less
a defense to the charge of assault 'with intent to murder' than it would be
to an accusation of attempt to murder, since an 'attempt' requires a more
substantial act towards completion than does mere 'intent.' "11
120. Id. at 486, 397 S.E.2d at 122 (quoting Teal v. State, 122 Ga. App. 532, 533, 177
S.E.2d 840, 842 ,(1970)). Compare the result in Byrer with the decision in Arnett v. State,
245 Ga. 470, 265 S.E.2d 771 (1980), which involved similar facts but resulted in a reversal.
121. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-3(a) (1988) provides: "A person commits the offense of involuntary
manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act when he causes the death of another
human being without any intention to do so by the commission of an unlawful act other
than a felony. . .

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

."

Id.

Id. § 16-5-1(c).
260 Ga. at 484, 397 S.E.2d at 120.
See also Patterson v. Balkcom, 260 Ga. 563, 397 S.E.2d 550 (1990).
198 Ga. App. 29, 401 S.E.2d 13 (1990).
O.C.G.A.§ 16-5-21(a)(1) (Supp. 1991) provides: "A person commits ...

assault when he assaults: (1) With intent to murder ..
127.

"

Id.

198 Ga. App. at 33, 401 S.E.2d at 18.

128. Id. at 37, 401 S.E.2d at 21.
129. Id. at 31, 401 S.E.2d at 16.
130. Id. at 33, 401 S.E.2d at 18 (citing O.C.G.A. § 16-4-4(c) (1988)).
131. Id. at 34, 401 S.E.2d at 18.

aggravated
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Since the actual death-producing capability of the bite was irrelevant
as charged, the expert witnesses would not have helped defendant. What
mattered was that Scroggins believed that the bite was deadly, and the
evidence adequately supported that conclusion. In addition, the trial
judge erroneously charged the jury that they must find the use of a
deadly weapon. 13 ' Finding the charge to be harmless, 83 the court, in apparent dicta, stated that there was ample evidence to find the bite to be a
deadly weapon beyond a reasonable doubt.'"
The State got caught in a merger problem of its own creation by
overcharging in Redding v. State.18 5 In Redding the State charged defendant with attempted armed robbery and with assault with intent to
rob in circumstances .arising out of the same offense. The jury convicted,
and the trial court entered judgment on both counts. 186 In a previous appeal, the court of appeals in Redding v. State 87 had reversed and remanded in part because the two offenses merged as a matter of fact."88 On
remand, the trial court entered judgment and sentenced Redding to the
twenty-year maximum on the aggravated assault count.18 ' On appeal from
the remand, the court of appeals again reversed and remanded, holding
that aggravated assault merged into attempted armed robbery, not the
other way around.140 In reaching this result, the court of appeals relied on
Hambrick v.State.141 This ruling was important to Redding because the
maximum sentence for attempted armed robbery is ten years.14' The
maximum sentence for the same conduct under aggravated assault is
132. Id. at 35, 401 S.E.2d at 19.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 36, 401 S.E.2d at 20. "So long as medical science concedes this 'theoretical
possibility' [transmittal of the virus], the jury was well within the evidence to consider the
human bite of a person infected with the AIDS virus to be 'deadly.'" Id.
135. 196 Ga. App. 751, 397 S.E.2d 34 (1990).
136. Id. at 751, 397 S.E.2d at 34.
137. 193 Ga. App. 50, 386 S.E.2d 907 (1989).
138. Id. at 52-53, 386 S.E.2d at 909.
139. 196 Ga. App. at 751, 397 S.E.2d at 35.

140. Id.
141. 256 Ga. 148, 344 S.E.2d 639 (1986), affd, 257 Ga. 345, 360 S.E.2d 719 (1987). It is
not clear that Hambrick requires such a result. In Hambrick the supreme court merely held

that both convictions could not stand and that the aggravated assault convictions merged
into the attempted armed robbery convictions. It does not appear that there was an issue of
which conviction merged into which. 256 Ga. at 149, 344 S.E.2d at 641.
142. O.C.G.A. § 16-4-6(a) (1988) provides: "Aperson convicted of the offense of criminal
attempt to commit a crime punishable by death or by life imprisonment shall be punished
by imprisonment for ... [not] more than ten years." Id. O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(b) (1988) pro-

vides: "Aperson convicted of ...armed robbery shall be punished by death or imprisonment for life or ...[not] more than 20 years." Id.
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twenty years.14 8 Thus, Redding's sentence was cut in half because he was
charged with two crimes arising out of the same conduct: attempted
armed robbery and aggravated assault.
Some still believe that using excessive force (a gun) in the commission
of a lawful act (self defense) might be involuntary manslaughter, and,
therefore, involuntary manslaughter (misdemeanor) should be charged as
a lesser offense.' 4 ' The court of appeals signaled its disagreement with
this belief in Bangs v. State.14 Citing Willis v. State,146 the court of appeals specifically overruled any prior cases which would hold contrary to
Willis. " 7
Sex Crimes. A rape conviction in Ranalli v. State' did not merge
into a kidnapping with bodily injury conviction legally or factually when
the bodily injury alleged in the indictment was not the rape, but "a laceration to the vaginal and perineal area" that occurred in the rape.1" Since
corroboration of the victim's testimony concerning the rape is not required, proof of vaginal injury or trauma is not required to prove rape
150
and, therefore, can support the bodily injury element.
151
In Clark v. State, defendant was convicted of raping a victim whom
he met at a bus stop and to whom he had offered a ride. He claimed
consent and appealed the trial judge's refusal to charge that the jury
must find the victim's fear was reasonable. " Clark contended that "'[ijf
the [victim's] intimidation or fear is not evident to the reasonable person,
then it would not be evident to the putative rapist,'" thereby negating
143.

O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(b) (Supp. 1991) provides: "[A] person convicted of the offense of

aggravated assault shall be punished by imprisonment for . ..[not) more than 20 years."

Id.
144. See O.C.G.A. § 16-5-3(b) (1988).
145. 198 Ga. App. 404, 343 S.E.2d 167 (1991).
146. 258 Ga. 477, 371 S.E.2d 376 (1988).
147. 198 Ga. App. at 405, 343 S.E.2d at 168.
"The use of [any deadly implement] negates any argument that the death occurred during the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner because if it
is self-defense it is no crime at all, and if it is not self-defense it is reckless conduct, which is a crime rather than a lawful act."
Id. (quoting Willis, 258 Ga. at 477-78, 371 S.E.2d at 377). The following cases were specifically overruled: Jackson v. State, 143 Ga. App. 734, 240 S.E.2d 180 (1977); Spradlin v.State,
151 Ga. App. 585, 260 S.E.2d 517 (1979); Hodge v. State, 153 Ga. App. 553, 265 S.E.2d 878
(1980); Mullins v. State, 157 Ga. App. 204, 276 S.E.2d 877 (1981); Benford v. State, 158 Ga.
App. 43, 279 S.E.2d 236 (1981); Neal v. State, 160 Ga. App. 498, 287 S.E.2d 399 (1981);
Billings v. State, 161 Ga. App. 500, 288 S.E.2d 622 (1982).
148. 197 Ga. App. 360, 398 S.E.2d 420 (1990).
149. Id. at 363, 398 S.E.2d at 423.
150. Id.
151. 197 Ga. App. 318, 398 S.E.2d 377 (1990), af'd, 261 Ga. 311, 404 S.E.2d 787 (1991).
152. 197 Ga. App. at 320, 398 S.E.2d at 379.
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the element of criminal intent. 5 3 The court of appeals found that the
question of intent which the jury must resolve is determined according to
the "reasonablenessof her testimony as to lack of consent, not the reasonableness of her fear.'

4

Further, on motion for rehearing, the court

held that "[a]s to the issue of consent, the victim's testimony as to her
fears may be examined for its credibility, but not for its reasonableness." 155 While in context the ruling may seem obvious, it may take on
great significance in date or spouse rape cases, in which a jury might be
more prone to try the victim, than in cases in which the parties are unknown to each other.
Offenses Against Public Order, Administration and Related
Crimes. In Whatley v. State,"' which concerned the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, the court of appeals dodged the
question of whether a nexus must be found between the firearm and the
felony committed. The court found a nexus between the drug violation
and the firearm. 57 It is unkown whether courts will require a nexus. Theoretically, the predicate felony might even be "habitual violator."'' 5
In Moon v. State,59 the court stretched the law prohibiting intimidation of an officer of the court "while in the discharge of such ... officer's
duties"' 0 to encompass the facts of the case. The victim, a judge, had
been threatened and his family had been intimidated. All of this occurred
more than one year after the judge had recused himself and was no longer
involved in defendant's pending misdemeanor case. The judge had previously taken action in the pending case, and defendant apparently blamed
the judge (and others) for things that occurred to him while he was in
e
jail.'
The court of appeals rejected Moon's contention that the phrase "while
in the discharge of such ... officer's duties" meant a violation could occur only "while the case is actually pending before the court officer."'
The court held instead that the language limited
153. Id. at 321, 398 S.E.2d at 379-80.

154. Id., 398 S.E.2d at 380.
155. Id. at 323, 398 S.E.2d at 381.
156. 196 Ga. App. 73, 395 S.E.2d 582 (1990).

157. Id. at 76, 395 S.E.2d at 585.
158. O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58(a) (1991).

159. 199 Ga. App. 94, 404 S.E.2d 273 (1991).
160. O.C.G.A. § 16-10-97 (Supp. 1991) provides, in part: "Aperson who by threat or
force or by any threatening letter or communication ... [e]ndeavors to intimidate or impede.., any officer ...of any court of this state... who may be serving at any proceeding in any such court while in the discharge of such... officer's duties... shall ... be

punished by a fine . . ." Id.
161. 199 Ga. App. at 94, 404 S.E.2d at 274.
162. Id. at 96, 404 S.E.2d at 275.
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the application of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-97 (1) to those situations which arise
out of or are related to the performance of the court officer's official duties, whether the proscribed activities occur while the court officer is actively engaged on the matter giving rise to the offense or whether the
proscribed activities occur at some other juncture.''
Property Crimes and Paper. In Cooley v. State,1 ' Cooley wrote a
check to a creditor to pay a judgment in magistrate court against him for
past due rent. Cooley gave no additional consideration at the time of the
check, and knew that the check would not be honored. The facts were
stipulated. 1 O.C.G.A. section 16-9-20(f)(2)(A) defines "present consideration" as including "an obligation or debt of rent which is past or presently due." 16 6 The court of appeals affirmed Cooley's conviction. The fact
that the debt had been rendered to a judgment did not negate the "pre1 67
sent consideration" as defined.
"I'll gladly pay you Tuesday for a hamburger today." If the ever hungry
cartoon character Wimpey succeeds in getting fed by his friend Popeye,
we know that Popeye will have to resort to his spinach to collect because
the courts, at least the criminal courts, will not help him. Merchants,
prosecutors, and trial judges, however, must be frequently reminded of
this fact. The court of appeals made three such reminders in three reversals during the survey period.
In Gill v.State,s 8 defendant bought a cellular telephone but failed to
pay for it within the agreed time. No security interest existed, and the
sale was complete. The merchant no longer had an interest in the property so it could not be the subject of theft; therefore, the court of appeals
reversed the theft by taking conviction. 6 '
The prosecution approached the problem differently in Robinson v.
State.1 70 In Robinson defendant was indicted and convicted of theft by

163. Id. at 97, 404 S.E.2d at 275-76. Whatever happened to strict construction of penal
statutes? See Palmer v. State, 260 Ga. 330, 331, 393 S.E.2d 251, 252 (1990).
164. 197 Ga. App. 340, 398 S.E.2d 414 (1990).
165. Id. at 340, 398 S.E.2d at 415.
166. O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20(a), (f)(2)(A) (Supp. 1991) provide:

(a) A person commits the offense of criminal issuance of a bad check when he
makes, draws, utters, or delivers a check ... in exchange for present consideration ...knowing that it will not be honored by the drawee.
(f) As used in this Code Section, the term: (2) "Present consideration" shall
include without limitation:
(A) An obligation or debt of rent which is past due or presently due;
Id.
167. 197 Ga. App. at 340, 398 S.E.2d at 415.
168. 197 Ga. App. 558, 398 S.E.2d 833 (1990).
169. Id. at 560, 398 S.E.2d at 835.
170.

198 Ga. App. 431, 401 S.E.2d 621 (1991).
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deception."' Defendant had received investments on the basis of his
promise to repay with a dividend in the future. Defendant went bankrupt
and did not repay as promised. " 2 The court of appeals first held that the
evidence failed to prove that Robinson "obtained property" because the
state presented no evidence that he diverted or personally used the
funds. 173 Second, the statements of defendant which prompted the investments were promises of a future payment.1 7' "While the breach of that
promise may give rise to a civil action, it cannot be the basis for a convic' 5
tion under OCGA § 16-8-3(b) (1).1
Theft by conversion fared no better in Hill v. State. 7 Hill obtained a
fee on the promise that he would assist the victim in obtaining financing
for a purchaser of the victim's property and that if he failed, he would
return the fee. When he failed, Hill returned the money by a bad check;
in other words, Hill never repaid.177 The court held that since the money
was obtained as a fee for services in the future, the victim had no more
interest in the cash with which he had parted.178 No agreement existed
with respect to how the funds would be applied and, therefore, the victim's only interest was in performance of the future promised services.
The victim might have a civil case, but the State had not proved conversion. In reversing the conviction, the court noted authority in the previous case of Byrd v. State,'7' which might have supported the conviction. 1 0 However, four of the judges, Carley, Birdsong, Sognier, and
Cooper, would overrule that case.' 8' Judge Beasley, with whom Judges
171.

O.C.G.A. § 16-8-3(a), (b)(1), (b)(5) (1988) provide:
(a) A person commits the offense of theft by deception when he obtains property by any deceitful means or artful practice with the intention of depriving the
owner of the property.
(b) A person deceives if he intentionally:
(1) Creates or confirms another's impression of an existing fact or past
event which is false and which the accused knows or believes to be false;

(5) Promises performance of services which he does not intend to perform
or knows will not be performed. Evidence of failure to perform standing
alone shall not be sufficient to authorize a conviction ...
Id. (emphasis added).
172. 198 Ga. App. at 432, 401 S.E.2d at 622.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 434, 401 S.E.2d at 622-23.
175. Id. at 432, 401 S.E.2d at 623.
176. 198 Ga. App. 1, 401 S.E.2d 48 (1990).
177. Id. at 1, 401 S.E.2d at 48.
178. Id. at 2, 401 S.E.2d at 49.
179. 186 Ga. App. 446, 367 S.E.2d 300 (1988).
180. 198 Ga. App. at 2, 401 S.E.2d at 49.
181. Id. at 3-4, 401 S.E.2d at 49-50.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Deen, McMurray and Pope joined, dissented. 82 Although the court concluded that no agreement existed with respect to application of the funds;
according to the dissenters, that an agreement to repay had been made in
Hill should have been a distinguishing fact that would salvage Hill, Byrd,
and future similar prosecutions.1 83 Whether or not an agreement for application of the funds was in place should be determined by the jury regardless of the terminology that the funds were a fee for services. As
promised to return the vicpointed out by Judge Beasley: 1"[defendant]
4
tim's money, . . . but kept it." 8
The court of appeals found reversible error in the trial judge's instruction in Brown v. State.' " The trial judge gave a charge on theft by receivand the jury returned a verdict of
ing on a theft by taking indictment,
guilty of theft by receiving. 18s The court of appeals stressed that theft by
receiving is not a lesser included offense of theft by taking. "'They are
two completely different crimes, having different elements, and are in
fact, so mutually exclusive that the thief and the receiver cannot even be
accomplices.' ,1"'9 Since one may not be convicted of a crime not charged
in the indictment and theft by receiving is not included in theft by taking
(nor in burglary, larceny, or robbery), 18' it is error for the judge to charge
and for the jury to convict of theft by receiving on a theft by taking
indictment.189
182. Id. at 4-5, 401 S.E.2d at 50-51 (Deen, McMurray, Pope & Beasley, JJ., dissenting).
183. Id. at 3, 401 S.E.2d at 50.
184. Id. at 5, 401 S.E.2d at 50 (Dean, McMurray, Pope & Beasley, JJ., dissenting).
185. 199 Ga. App. 18, 404 S.E.2d 154 (1991).
186. Id. at 19, 404 S.E.2d at 156.
187. Id. at 21, 404 S.E.2d at 158 (quoting Plummer v. State, 126 Ga. App. 482, 483, 191
S.E.2d 333, 333 (1972)).
188. Id. at 22, 404 S.E.2d at 158.
189. Id. This should have never occurred because the prosecutor can easily anticipate
and remedy this situation. In any case in which the prosecutor has some doubt about
whether the defendant is the actual thief, he only needs to include in the theft by taking (or
burglary or robbery) indictment the following: "[Aind said accused did retain said property
(describe) which he knew was stolen, without intent to restore it to the owner." O.C.G.A. §
16-8-7 (1988). While one may not be a thief and a receiver of the same property, either or
both can be a retainer of stolen property. The problem then becomes one of evidence, not a
limitation in the indictment. Theft by "receiving" by "retaining stolen property" would then
be included (but not lesser included, since they carry the same penalty, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-12
(1988)) as a matter of fact, and having been charged in the indictment, would support the
jury charge and conviction of theft by receiving. (This is commonly done in malice/felony
murder indictments. Jolley v. State, 254 Ga. 624, 627, 331 S.E.2d 516, 518-19 (1985); Middlebrooks v. State, 253 Ga. 707, 324 S.E.2d 192, 193 (1985); but see McCrary v. State, 252
Ga. 521, 314 S.E.2d 662 (1984) where, as here, there were insufficient allegations in the
indictment to allow the other charge.)
In the alternative, an indictment charging both theft in one count, and receiving in another count, for each item or batch of property, could be returned. Only one of the two
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Drugs. The court of appeals in Jones v. State19 0 held that " '[a] sale of
drugs is complete when the seller delivers the drugs to the feigned
buyer"' and that proof of an exchange of money was not necessary in the
context of a cocaine trafficking case.' 1' The usual indictment for trafficking would allege "possession;" however, in Jones, the sale had been arranged so that an accomplice made the delivery. For some reason the
prosecutor must have felt that the evidence would prove that Jones was a
party to the sale but not to possession. 19 In any event, this problem
should not arise in trafficking or any other drug type cases. A prosecutor
need merely allege in any sale or trafficking case predicated upon sale
that the defendant "did sell and deliver" the drug, since "deliver" cerThe prosecutor may
tainly does not require proof of a money exchange.'"3
94
then prove either sale or delivery or both.
There is only one cocaine trafficking offense. Possession of twenty-eight
grams of cocaine sufficiently establishes that offense, regardless of jury
charges on different quantities and gradations of the offense,'" and regardless of an erroneous amount alleged in the indictment.'" In that regard, trafficking in cocaine is like theft' 97 because the different quantities
only affect punishment.'"8 Probably, as in theft, only in a case of dispute
as to quantity above twenty-eight grams would the jury be required to
assist the court in determining quantity and hence, indirectly, sentence.'"

convictions may stand, but both may be submitted to the jury. Callahan v. State, 148 Ga.
App. 555, 557, 251 S.E.2d 790, 792 (1978) ("Theft by taking must be considered an included
offense in theft by receiving in this case as a matter of fact."); see also Thomas v. State, 199
Ga. App. 586, 405 S.E.2d 512 (1991) (mutually exclusive armed robbery and theft by receiving verdicts, in which either or both would have been supported by the evidence).
190. 198 Ga. App. 881, 403 S.E.2d 867 (1991).
191. Id. at 882, 403 S.E.2d at 868-69 (quoting Robinson v. State, 164 Ga. App. 652-54,
297 S.E.2d 751 (1982)). O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) (Supp. 1991) provides: "Any person who
knowingly sells, .. . delivers,. ., . or who is knowingly in possession of 28 grams or more of
cocaine... in violation of this article commits the felony offense of trafficking in cocaine
. ." Id.
192. See State v. Lewis, 249 Ga. 565, 292 S.E.2d 667 (1982) (party to possession).
193. O.C.G.A. § 16-13-21(7) (1988) provides: "'Deliver'. . . means the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance, whether or
not there is an agency relationship." Id.
194. Jones v. State, 75 Ga. App. 610, 44 S.E.2d 174 (1947).
195. Knight v. State, 197 Ga. App. 250, 253, 398 S.E.2d 202, 204 (1990).
196. Partridge v. State, 187 Ga. App. 325, 327, 370 S.E.2d 173, 174 (1988).
197. Id. at 327, 370 S.E.2d at 175.
198. Knight, 197 Ga. App. at 253, 398 S.E.2d at 204.
199. See Jones v. State, 147 Ga. App. 779, 250 S.E.2d 500 (1978).
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Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations ("RICO").200
The State may not use as predicate offenses for a RICO prosecution any
prior offenses for which the defendant has been previously or concur0
rently adjudicated guilty.2 1 Therefore, in Bethune v. State,'2
the court
of appeals held that some of the predicate offenses to which Bethune had
previously plead guilty in another county would not support the RICO
conviction .2 0 However, plenty of other predicate offenses were alleged
and proven. As the State is "not required.., to prove all the predicate
offenses alleged in the indictment, but is required to prove only two beyond a reasonable doubt," the court held that the conviction need not be
reversed.20 ' Bethune further argued that the other predicate offenses
should be barred by the previous convictions and O.C.G.A. section 16-18(b)(1).' The court held that such a ruling would "destroy the purpose
of the Act ...[and] the body of criminal law in this state, including the
RICO Act, by requiring the State to instigate a RICO prosecution wherever any offense is committed, if it might conceivably have been a predi'
20
cate act.
C. Defenses Defined
Justification. The trial judge in Wainwright v. State2 07 erred in failing to give a charge on self-defense in defense of a third person on de200. O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 (1988). O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4(b) (1988) provides: "It is unlawful for
any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate in, directly or indirectly, such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity." Id.
A "[p]attern of racketeering activity" is defined, in part, as "engaging in at least two
incidents of racketeering activity that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices,
victims, or methods of commission." Id. § 16-14-3(8) (Supp. 1991).
201. Martin v. State, 189 Ga. App. 483, 496, 376 S.E.2d 888, 899 (1988).
202. 198 Ga. App. 490, 402 S.E.2d 276 (1991).
203. Id. at 491, 402 S.E.2d at 278.
204. Id. (citing Brown v. State, 191 Ga. App. 76, 381 S.E.2d 101 (1989)).
205. O.C.G.A. § 16-1-8(b)(1) (1988) provides:
(b) A prosecution is barred if the accused was formerly prosecuted for a different crime or for the same crime based upon different facts, if such former
prosecution:
(1) Resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal and the subsequent
prosecution is for a crime of which the accused could have been convicted
on the former prosecution, is for a crime with which the accused should
have been charged on the former prosecution (unless the court ordered a
separate trial of such charge), or is for a crime which involves the same
conduct, unless each prosecution requires proof of a fact not required on
the other prosecution or unless the crime was not consummated when the
former trial began ....
Id.
206. 198 Ga. App. at 492, 402 S.E.2d at 278.
207. 197 Ga. App. 43, 397 S.E.2d 456 (1990).
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fendant's request."' This was so even though the judge agreed to give the
charge requested if defense counsel would agree to the State's requested
charge on mutual combat;2 0 ' and defense counsel declined to agree. "'If
an affirmative defense is raised by the evidence, including the defendant's
own statements, the trial court must present the affirmative defense to
the jury as part of the case in its charge, even absent a request.' "210 The
cover the affirmcourt's general charge on self-defense did not2 1adequately
1
ative defense of protection of third persons.
Prosecutors have long argued, usually successfully, that self-defense
and accident are mutually exclusive.2 12 In Smith v. State,'1 defendant
fired two shots; the first, which was fired to scare his wife because defendant feared for his life, killed an unintended victim.214 The supreme court
held that it was not error for the trial court to fail to charge on selfdefense as defendant did not intend to hit anyone.21 6 Defendant's actions
may have resulted in an accident but not self-defense. It should be noted,
however, that the trial court also did not charge on self-defense as to the
separate offense of aggravated assault on his wife with the same shots.2 6
As to that count, the self-defense charge clearly would have been authorized, but was not given because defense counsel withdrew the request for
self-defense 17 on the trial court's suggestion that self-defense and acci-

208. Id. at 44, 397 S.E.2d at 458. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a) (1988) provides:
(a) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and
to the extent that he reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary to
defend himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful
force; however, a person is justified in using force which is intended or likely to
cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is
necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself or a third person or to
prevent the commission of a forcible felony.
Id.
209. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(b)(3) (1988).
210. 197 Ga. App. at 44, 397 S.E.2d at 457 (quoting Booker v. State, 247 Ga. 74, 274
S.E.2d 334 (1981)). Affirmative defenses are defined in O.C.G.A. § 16-3-28 (1988) as all those
covered by Title 16, Chapter 3, Article 2, including justification, entrapment, coercion, and
others.
211. 197 Ga. App. at 44, 397 S.E.2d at 457.
212. See, e.g., Todd v. State, 149 Ga. App. 574, 254 S.E.2d 894 (1979).
213. 260 Ga. 274, 393 S.E.2d 229 (1990).
214. Id. at 277, 393 S.E.2d at 231.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 277-78, 393 S.E.2d at 232.
217. Id. at 278, 393 S.E.2d at 232.
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dent were inconsistent.2 18 Thus, the issue of inconsistency was not clearly

reached."'
Other Defenses. In Hill v. State,20 the supreme court held that the
State must present evidence to contradict the defense of entrapment in
order to avoid a directed verdict of acquittal.23 1 It may not merely impeach the defendant's testimony. " The court of appeals had refused to
adopt such a construction of the entrapment defense on the grounds that
it "[w]ould automatically allow the entrapment defense to prevail for
every first offense wherein law enforcement had any involvement in the
transaction." 23 However, Justice Smith wrote that if the court were to
rule otherwise "the entrapment defense would be worthless." 24 Justices
Hunt, Weltner, and Fletcher dissented.2 5 Where does this leave the

practitioner?
Apparently, after solicitation by a state agent, neither the relish, speed,
and ease with which a substantial sale of drugs is made, nor boastful
statements of large available quantities, nor offers by the defendant of
future sales with less difficulty"2 will be sufficient to rebut the defense of
entrapment provided that the defendant claims no predisposition to sell
drugs. The supreme court would hold that such evidence is merely impeachment and "not independent acts subsequent to the inducement but
218. Id. at 276, 393 S.E.2d at 231.
219. Id. at 276 n.3, 393 S.E.2d at 231 n.3. One is inclined to wonder what would have
happened on these facts if there had been no prosecution of the assault on the wife, and the
defense counsel had not withdrawn the request for the self-defense charge. If for no reason
other than an abundance of caution, but probably because it will be required, both charges
should be given in such cases.
220. 261 Ga. 377, 405 S.E.2d 258 (1991).
221. Id. at 377, 405 S.E.2d at 259. The entrapment defense is defined in O.C.G.A. § 16-325 (1988) which provides:
A person is not guilty of a crime if, by entrapment, his conduct is induced or
solicited by a government officer or employee, or agent of either, for the purpose
of obtaining evidence to be used in prosecuting the person for commission of the
crime. Entrapment exists where the idea and intention of the commission of the
crime originated with a government officer or employee, or with an agent of either,
and he, by undue persuasion, incitement, or deceitful means, induced the accused
to commit the act which the accused would not have committed except for the
conduct of such officer.
Id.
222. Id. at 377-78, 405 S.E.2d at 259-60.
223. Hill v. State, 197 Ga. App. 260, 261, 398 S.E.2d 226, 227 (1990).
224. 261 Ga. at 377, 405 S.E.2d at 259.
225. Id. at 378-79, 405 S.E.2d at 260.
226. See 197 Ga. App. at 261-62, 398 S.E.2d at 228. A characterization of the facts as
purported in Hill which the supreme court found were insufficient evidence of
predisposition.
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' s7
part of a course of conduct which was the product of the inducement,'
and, therefore, "cannot be used to show predisposition.' ' 2 2 In the context
of the drug trade, it is difficult to conceive of what kind of admissible
"factual evidence of predisposition"' "2 9 would survive a directed verdict of
acquittal except a previous conviction f a sale of drugs (probably recent),
a traceable ad in the paper, or an informant who would be willing to testify to prior sales.
"Mere presence at the scene of the crime" at the time of its commission
is not a defense,"20 per se, but it is a frequently requested and given
charge"23 and is still a valid principle of law. Nevertheless, one must won-

227. 261 Ga. at 377, 405 S.E.2d at 259 (citing Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369,
374 (1958)).
228. Id.
229. What is troubling about Hill is that the supreme court seemingly ignores the "second element" of entrapment In Keaton v. State, 253 Ga. 70, 316 S.E.2d 452 (1984), the
supreme court held that three distinct elements embodied the entrapment defense: "(1) the
idea for the commission of the crime must originate with the state agent; (2) the crime must
be induced by the agent's undue persuasion, incitement, or deceit; and (3) the defendant
must not be predisposed to commit the crime." Id. at 72, 316 S.E.2d at 454 (emphasis
added).
In Hill the supreme court seems to conclude that if the state's agent makes the initial
contact (element 1, supra) and the defendant claims no predisposition (element 3, supra),
the burden shifts to the State to disprove entrapment. The second element, supra, and
more particularly the modifier undue in the phrase "undue persuasion, incitement, or deceit" is part of O.C.G.A. § 16-3-25 (1988) and should appear somewhere in the evidence
before the State should be required to rebut the entrapment defense. What amount of "persuasion, incitement, or deceit" is "undue"? We already have a clue. Keaton, supra, struck
down part of a previous pattern jury instruction on entrapment dealing with the subjective
intent of the officer but let stand a portion of that charge. 253 Ga. at 71, 316 S.E.2d at 454.
The court also held that "[t]he agent's conduct is to be viewed objectively, and evaluated by
the jury in light of the standard of conduct exercised by reasonable persons generally." Id.
at 72, 316 S.E.2d at 455. This author recommends that in order to facilitate an objective
evaluation utilizing a reasonable person standard, a definition of "undue persuasion, incitement, or deceit" should be adopted as follows: "persuasion, deceit, or trickery of such a kind
or degree as could reasonably cause an otherwise innocent ordinary person to commit the
crime." This is similar to language already approved by the court in Keaton. See id. at 71 &
n.1, 316 S.E.2d at 454 & n.1.
230. Muhammad v. State, 243 Ga. 404, 254 S.E.2d 356 (1979). The rule is "really a corollary to the requirement that the state prove each element of the offense charged." Id. at 406,
254 S.E.2d at 358. Even if it is the sole defense, and is requested, it is not error to fail to
give the "mere presence" charge. Id.; see also Bowley v. State, 261 Ga. 278, 404 S.E.2d 97
(1991).
231. Suggested PatternJury Instructions Volume II, Criminal Cases, State of Georgia,
by Council of Superior Court Judges of Georgia, Part 3 D, p. 23 provides:
Mere presence of a person, at the scene of the commission of a crime, at the
time of its perpetration, without more, will not, of itself, authorize a jury to find
the person who was merely present, guilty of consent in, and concurrence in, the
commission of the crime; unless the evidence shows, beyond a reasonable doubt,
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der about its validity in view of the decisions of two appeals decided the
same day by different panels in the court of appeals. In the Interest of A.
H.,' ss in which Judge Beasley wrote a strong dissent, 38s concerned a witness who observed defendant juvenile arriving at a residence fifteen to
twenty minutes before crack cocaine was delivered there. One half hour
after the delivery, the police raided the residence. Defendant was found
in the ten-by-twelve foot living room with others. The cocaine had been
altered and was easily visible in the room, as were a razor blade and glassine bags. Defendant claimed to have been
watching television.2 ' The
235
court of appeals affirmed the conviction.

In Deal v. State,33e defendant was one of several men arrested in a
motel room where a search revealed guns and money. A large quantity of
cocaine was also found inside the box springs of the bed in another motel
room apparently occupied by the parties. Defendant had been traveling
with the other men and was related to some of them, All of the men denied any knowledge of the guns and money.28 As in A.H., the appellate
court affirmed the convictions.2 "

III.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

A. Pre-trial
Arrest. Although an officer was given the option of issuing a citation
for a traffic violation,28 ' he was not precluded from making a custodial
arrest in Brock v. State.240 In the same case, it was held that the warrantless arrest of defendant in the doorway of his house was proper because
defendant was retreating from an arrest which began in his front yard.24 1
that such person committed the alleged crime, or that such person aided and abetted in the actual perpetration of the crime, or participated in the criminal
endeavor.
232.

199 Ga. App. 178, 404 S.E.2d 341 (1991).

233. Id. at 179-80, 404 S.E.2d at 342 (Beasley, J., dissenting). "Knowledge of the presence of, and activity surrounding, the cocaine, and even approval of it which does not
amount to encouragement, is not sufficient." Id. (citing Ridgeway v. State, 187 Ga. App. 381,

370 S.E.2d 216 (1988)).
234. 199 Ga. App. at 178-79, 404 S.E.2d at 342.

235. Id. at 181, 404 S.E.2d at 346.
236. 199 Ga. App. 184, 404 S.E.2d 343 (1991).
237. Id. at 184-86, 404 S.E.2d at 343-44.

238. Id. at 188, 404 S.E.2d at 346.
239.

O.C.G.A. § 17-4-23(a) (1990) provides: "A law enforcement officer may arrest a per-

son accused of violating any law or ordinance governing the operation, licensing, registration, maintenance or inspection of motor vehicles by the issuance of a citation ...." Id.
240. 196 Ga. App. 605, 396 S.E.2d 785 (1990).
241. Id. at 607, 396 S.E.2d at 786.
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"'[A] suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a
public place . .. by the expedient of escaping to a private place.' ",242
This was a lawful "hot pursuit" arrest.
In Hamrick v. State,"' another "hot pursuit" case, police pursued a

speeding motorcyclist who was driving without lights on his vehicle and
was refusing to stop. The police lost sight of the vehicle several times.
However, by following directions from civilians and by following the motorcycle's tracks, they found the motorcycle against defendant's house
within a short time. The motor was "very hot and the motorcycle was
dripping mud and water.' 4'

Three policemen knocked on the door and

told the woman who answered the door that they wanted to see the operator of the motorcycle. When she stated that her husband was asleep, the
policemen told her to wake him up. The police entered the house without
invitation.' 4 1 The court held that defendant's wet muddy boots and the

results of his blood alcohol test were illegally obtained and, therefore,
must be suppressed.24 This "hot pursuit" apparently was not hot enough.
"'Exigency' faded from the picture, and left defendant's right to prevent
an unwarranted invasion of his home superior."' "4 7 Warrantless arrests in

the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, absent probable
cause and exigent circumstances."
License checks and roadblocks without any particularized suspicion 49of
wrongdoing are alive and well in Georgia, according to Kan v. State.'
50
Search and Seizure: Terry Stops. Technically, a Terry stop

should probably come under the heading of arrest; however, Terry issues
only arise when a defendant has made an incriminating statement, or police have seized property through consent or plain view, or made subsequent arrest and search incident to that arrest, or made an inventory
search. Therefore, the Terry cases, and they are legion, will be included
under this heading.
"'Theoretically, there are at least three kinds of police-citizen encounters: verbal encounters involving no coercion or detention [which do
242. Id., 396 S.E.2d at 786-87 (quoting United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976)).
The court also cited to Santana for the proposition that "a person standing in the open
doorway of her house was in a public place subject to arrest by police upon probable cause
and without violating the Fourth Amendment." Id., 396 S.E.2d at 787.
243. 198 Ga. App. 124, 401 S.E.2d 25 (1990).
244. Id. at 125, 401 S.E.2d at 26.
245. Id. at 124, 401 S.E.2d at 26.
246. Id. at 126, 401 S.E.2d at 27.
247. Id.
248. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
249. 199 Ga. App. 170, 404 S.E.2d 281 (1991).
250. So named after Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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not invoke the Fourth Amendment]; brief 'stops' or 'seizures' which must
be accompanied by a reasonable suspicion; and 'arrests' which must be
supported by probable cause.' "151 The least intrusive of these are the verbal encounters. Most airport drug cases begin in this way. The problem
lies in determining when certain thresholds of intrusiveness are crossed
with reference to similar thresholds of articulable suspicion or probable
cause.
In State v. Grant, 62 the government agent had articulable suspicion
(the usual airport, Miami connection, nervous appearance, etc. factors),
but insufficient probable cause to arrest or search. The agent asked defendant if he would allow him to search defendant's bag; defendant responded that "he would cooperate if the agents possessed a search warrant."'' The agents notified defendant that he was free to leave, but that
they would detain his luggage. They gave him a receipt. The agents
promptly sent for the drug detecting dog in another county. When the
dog arrived, it alerted to defendant's bag. Now with probable cause, the
agents obtained a search warrant, searched the bag, and found cocaine."'
The principles of Terry have been extended to luggage reasonably suspected of containing narcotics.2 6 In cases of luggage detention, a two-fold
inquiry must be made: (1) Did the police have reasonable cause to detain
the luggage? (2) Was the detention so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable upon reasonable cause?'"5 In addressing the former question and
finding "reasonable cause," the court of appeals in Grant noted that in
cases of this kind, "courts should treat the judgment of experienced officers with a considerable amount of deference. Because of their expertise,
these officers are 'able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer.' ,,257
More than one hour passed between the time defendant's bag was seized
and the time that the drug detecting dog supplied probable cause.28 Noting a similar case in which a detention of ninety minutes was held to be
too lengthy,'8 ' the court distinguished that case from Grant because unlike in Grant, the agents had prewarning of the courier's arrival and made
251.

Jamison v. State, 199.Ga. App. 401, 404, 405 S.E.2d 82, 84 (1991) (quoting Verhoeff

v. State, 184 Ga. App. 501, 502, 362 S.E.2d 85, 87 (1987)) (citations omitted).
252. 195 Ga. App. 859, 394 S.E.2d 916 (1990). This is one of many cases during the
survey period in which the trial judge was reversed for granting a motion to suppress.
253.

Id. at 860, 394 S.E.2d at 917.

254. Id. at 861, 394 S.E.2d at 918.
255. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
256. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
257. 195 Ga. App. at 862, 394 S.E.2d at 919 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 48
(1979)).

258. Id. at 859, 394 S.E.2d at 917.
259. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
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no preparation; in Grant the agents acted diligently.' 0 These cases are
lengthy because the facts are always subtle, and each case will, of necessity, turn on its own facts.
"Flight" has been outlawed as a charge to the jury, 201 but it has taken
on new life in the area of search and seizure. In Jamison v. State,26 the
Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") agent admitted that "the circumstances surrounding the stop of [Jamison] did not present. . . articulable
suspicion that [Jamison] was committing a crime until the moment [Jamison] 'broke and ran.' ",28 The previous intrusion had been minimal. Because of the suspicious circumstances (Miami connection, baggy clothes,
one way flight reservation, paid for in cash, and no call-back number),
casually dressed agents displaying no weapons approached the defendant
in a conversational tone. Defendant cooperated until he was asked to submit to a body search, which he declined to do. Upon being asked two
more times, defendant became nervous and ran two steps before being
tackled and handcuffed. A body search revealed drugs.' 6 4 In a six-three
opinion, the court of appeals affirmed Jamison's conviction.2" This case
jumps from a non-Fourth Amendment conversation directly to arrest,
bypassing Terry altogether. The forcible detention and handcuffing could
only be characterized as an arrest, not a Terry stop. Therefore, probable
cause, not merely articulable suspicion, would be required. The court of
appeals agreed with the trial court that the circumstances "ripened into
probable cause at the moment [defendant] ran, taking in all the other
facts and circumstances.'

2 66

Judges Carley and Cooper joined Chief Judge

7
Sognier in a lengthy dissent.2
In Jones v. State, " a valid Terry stop of an automobile based on marginal information from a concerned citizen "ripened" into probable cause
by flight.2" An officer, having an informant's or concerned citizen's tip or
personal observation not amounting to probable cause, makes a vehicle
approach or stop. Based on a Terry pat down, a plain view observation, or

260. 195 Ga. App. at 864, 394 S.E.2d at 919.
261. Renner v. State, 260 Ga. 515, 397 S.E.2d 683 (1990). See infra text accompanying

note 262.
262.
263.

199 Ga. App. 401, 405 S.E.2d 82 (1991).
Id. at 407, 405 S.E.2d at 86 (Sognier, C.J., dissenting).

264. Id. at 404, 405 S.E.2d at 84.
265. Id. at 405, 405 S.E.2d at 85.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 406, 405 S.E.2d at 85-88 (Sognier, C.J. & Carley & Cooper, JJ., dissenting).
268. 195 Ga. App. 868, 395 S.E.2d 69 (1990).
269. Id. at 869, 395 S.E.2d at 70-71. Compare Salter v. State, 198 Ga. App. 242, 401
S.E.2d 541 (1990). In Salter flight provided articulable suspicion, but not probable cause,

when added to marginal information from a concerned citizen; therefore a Terry stop would
have been authorized, but not the arrest and search performed.

202
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an admission by defendant, probable cause often develops after the stop.
These facts are similar to many cases during the survey period.270 In
those cases in which the officer(s) went through a progression rather than
jumping immediately to arrest, as in Salter v. State,'71 all searches were
affirmed.
"Merely observing a can of beer in the hand of one who is otherwise
driving a car or. . .boat in a safe manner" does, in and of itself, constitute articulable suspicion that driving under the influence272 or "boating
under the influence 273 may be occurring so as to authorize a brief investigatory stop. 74 Although it is not probable cause, such an observation
does warrant further
investigation regarding whether the driver is under
27 5
the influence.
In Patterson v. State,27 1 a similar but stronger ruling that may be of
concern to the National Rifle Association, the court held that proof that a
person carried a pistol in public establishes not only articulable suspicion
or probable cause, but also a prima facie case of carrying a pistol without
a license, carrying a concealed weapon, or both.27 7 The court found probable cause to arrest existed when the officer saw Patterson toss an object
he removed from his clothing into a vehicle, since the object appeared to
the officer to be a weapon.276 Therefore, the search was lawful as a search
incident to arrest. The probable cause "existed . . .even before he was
asked whether he had a license to carry the pistol," because the person
270. Hamrick v. State, 198 Ga. App. 124, 401 S.E.2d 25 (1990); State v. Miller, 197 Ga.
App. 99, 397 S.E.2d 508 (1990); Wilson v. State, 197 Ga. App. 181, 397 S.E.2d 744 (1990);
Anthony v. State, 197 Ga. App. 297, 398 S.E.2d 580 (1990); State v. Rhule, 197 Ga. App. 47,
397 S.E.2d 556 (1990). All searches were upheld.
271. 198 Ga. App. 242, 401 S.E.2d 541 (1990).
272. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391 (1991).
273. O.C.G.A. § 52-7-12(a) (Supp. 1991) provides: "No person shall operate, navigate,
steer or drive any vessel, or be in actual physical control of any moving vessel .... while: (1)
Under the influence of alcohol; .... ." Id.
274. State v. Baker, 197 Ga. App. 1, 2, 397 S.E.2d 554, 555 (1990).
275. Id. at 2, 397 S.E.2d at 555. Note, this decision predates the new "open container"
law. O.C.G.A. 40-6-253(b) (1991).
276. 196 Ga. App. 754, 397 S.E.2d 38 (1990).
277. Id. at 755, 397 S.E.2d at 38-39 (citing Jordan v. State, 166 Ga. App. 417, 304 S.E.2d
522 (1983)). O.C.G.A. § 16-11-128(a) (1988) provides: "A person commits the offense of carrying a pistol without a license when he has or carries on or about his person, outside of his
home, motor vehicle, or place of business, any pistol or revolver without having on his person a valid license ...." Id. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126(a) (1988) provides: "A person commits
the offense of carrying a concealed weapon when he knowingly has or carries about his person, unless in an open manner and fully exposed to view, any ... firearm ... outside of his
home or place of business. ... ."Id. Exceptions are also provided.

278. 196 Ga. App. at 754, 397 S.E.2d at 38.
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carrying a weapon has the burden of proving he has a valid license.27 9
Apparently, no Terry approach and inquiry was required.
At least one court held that an anonymous tip, with no detail or verification by independent observation, was not sufficient for even a Terry
stop of an automobile.2 0 The subsequent consent gained through threat
of a search warrant was not valid, and the court suppressed the evidence."' 1 In Johnson v. State,"2' the court held that police investigation
was warranted but "further observation
and corroboration was required
2'' 88
before a forcible stop was authorized.

Search and Seizure: Search Incident to Lawful Arrest. Frequently, a Terry stop will produce additional probable cause, thereby
leading to an arrest. Also, arrests are frequently made upon probable
cause to arrest or with an arrest warrant. In New York v. Belton,2" the
United States Supreme Court held that "when a policeman has made a
lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile."2 8 This is true in Georgia even if the police
removed the arrestee from the vehicle and handcuffed him. 86
In Daniel v. State, se 7 defendant challenged the search of an automobile, which was incident to arrest, under Georgia statutory law. The statutory law provides that in such instances, the officer is authorized to search
the person and the immediate vicinity for the officer's protection, to prevent escape, and to seize fruits and instrumentalities of crime. 288 Daniel
279. Id. (citing Jordan v. State, 166 Ga. App. 417, 304 S.E.2d 522 (1983)).
280. Johnson v. State, 197 Ga. App. 538, 398 S.E.2d 826 (1990).
281. Id. at 538, 398 S.E.2d at 827.

282. 197 Ga. App. 538, 398.S.E.2d 826 (1990).
283. Id. at 539-40, 398 S.E.2d at 828.
284. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).

285. Id. at 460.
286. Sims v. State, 197 Ga. App. 214, 215, 398 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1990); State v. Tinsley,

194 Ga. App. 350, 351, 390 S.E.2d 289, 290 (1990).
287. 199 Ga. App. 180, 404 S.E.2d 466 (1991).
288. O.C.G.A. § 17-5-1(a) (1990) provides:
When a lawful arrest is effected a peace officer may reasonably search the person arrested and the area within the person's immediate presence for the purpose
of:
(1) Protecting the officer from attack;
(2) Preventing the person from escaping;
(3) Discovering or seizing the fruits of the crime for which the person has
been arrested; or
(4) Discovering or seizing any instruments, articles or things which are
being used or which may have been used in the commission of the crime for
which the person has been arrested.
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also urged that an officer be required to make two inquiries, one under
state law and one under federal law, before deciding to conduct a search
incident to arrest.'" The court of appeals rejected these contentions, noting that such a ruling would frustrate the stated purpose of the supreme
court "'to establish .. .a single familiar standard .. .to guide police
officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they may confront."'o The state rule is the same as the federal
rule.'9 1 In a special concurrence, Judge Beasley pointed out that this challenge was under state law and did not address the Georgia
9
Constitution.2
In Sanchez v.State,"'3 a nuance on an automobile pretext stop, the
officers had probable cause to arrest and search, but, apparently lacking
confidence in their probable cause or the law, they chose to arrest for a
no-insurance violation. Unfortunately, defendant was from out of state,
and the insurance requirement was inapplicable, thereby rendering the
arrest invalid.2' Recognizing that the initial no insurance charge was
"merely .. .a pretext for taking [defendant] in custody,"' the court
held that, since the officers had probable cause to arrest for the drug
charge, on which defendant was ultimately charged and convicted, the
mere fact that the officers used an unnecessary pretext did not invalidate
the arrest and subsequent search.2" This appears to be the opposite of
the good faith rule, in that bad faith did not invalidate what would have
been a lawful arrest.
Inventories. In Reed v. State,"" police arrested the driver of a van
for driving without a license. The driver said the van had been lent to
him. The van was not reported stolen, and one of the passengers present
had a driver's license. Nevertheless, the officers impounded the vehicle to
"secure it for the owner."' 98 Naturally, an inventory was conducted,
which revealed stolen property."' The court held that it was unnecessary

289. 199 Ga. App. at 181, 404 S.E.2d at 467.
290. Id. at 181-82, 404 S.E.2d at 468 (quoting State v. Hopkins, 163 Ga. App. 141, 144,
293 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1982)).
291. Id. at 182, 404 S.E.2d at 468 (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); State
v. Hopkins, 163 Ga. App. 141 (1982)).
292. Id., 404 S.E.2d at 468 (Beasley, J., concurring),
293. 197 Ga. App. 470, 398 S.E.2d 740 (1991).
294. Id. at 471-72, 398 S.E.2d at 741.

295. Id., 398 S.E.2d at 742.
296. Id. at 472, 398 S.E.2d at 742.

297. 195 Ga. App. 821, 395 S.E.2d 294 (1990).
298. Id. at 822-23, 395 S.E.2d at 295.
299. Id.

CRIMINAL LAW

1991]

and therefore an error to impound the vehicle, when a reliable third party
was present to drive. 00 Consequently, the rule seems to require the officer
to turn an automobile over to a third party without the owner's permission. The evidence indicates, however, that the officer did allow the third
party to drive the vehicle to the sheriff's office.301 That argument, therefore, is somewhat precluded.
In Gooden v.State,302 the court clarified that the rule against impoundment may not prevail when countervailing policy considerations are present.303 In Gooden, a similar license and speed violation case in which the
car also had an illegal tag, there was no third party present, and the officer and driver dickered over calling a third party to pick up the automobile since that would have taken forty to forty-five minutes. The officer
impounded the car pursuant to a departmental policy that required such
vehicles be impounded after ten to fifteen minutes.3 " The court of appeals found that the policy was not unreasonable and upheld the inventory.305 Judge Beasley, with whom Judges Sognier and Cooper joined, dissented.306 Apparently, the dissent would have had the officer make
further efforts to find a third party whom defendant had not named,
seemingly ignoring that the vehicle had an illegal tag and, therefore, it
would have been illegal for even the third party to drive the van. The car
itself, with the illegal tag, constituted evidence of the violation and could
have been seized for that reason.
Plain View. In State v. Almond 307 a law enforcement officer, acting
in his moonlighting capacity as a maintenance man, entered defendant's
apartment pursuant to a work order. After noting contraband, the officer
finished his work order, exited, and reported the contraband. A search
warrant was executed, and the contraband was recovered. In his other
capacity as a law enforcement officer, the officer had previously been advised to keep a look out on the apartment, presumably for illegal activity.
The officer entered legally and did not exceed the scope of his invitation.30 8 The court held that there was no state action at which the exclusionary rule is aimed.30 9 "An officer is not required to ignore what he ob300. Id. at 823, 395 S.E.2d at 295.

301. Id.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

196 Ga. App. 295, 395 S.E.2d 634 (1990).
Id. at 296-97, 395 S.E.2d at 635-36.
Id. at 297, 395 S.E.2d at 636.
Id. at 295, 395 S.E.2d at 635.
Id. at 297, 395 S.E.2d at 636 (Sognier, C.J., Cooper & Beasley, JJ., dissenting).
196 Ga. App. 40, 395 S.E.2d 609 (1990).
Id. at 40-41, 395 S.E.2d at 609-10.

309. Id. at 41, 395 S.E.2d at 610.
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serves [in plain view] when legitimately acting in another capacity.Y31
Noting that there is no "inadvertence" requirement for the plain view
doctrine,"1 ' the court further held that despite the officer's possible ulterior or dual motive in entering the apartment, a finding of no impermissi312
ble invasion was merited.
1 3 the Dougherty County
Search Warrants. In Harrisv. State,3
Magistrate issued a search warrant to be executed in Fulton County for dental
impressions of defendant's teeth for bite mark comparison. After the warrant was executed, the court suppressed the fruits of the search because
the Dougherty County Magistrate had no jurisdiction to issue a search
warrant to be executed in another county. Police obtained another search
warrant in Fulton County and likewise executed it.314 The supreme court
rejected defendant's argument that the results of the second search warrant should be excluded because the evidence was previously suppressed,
since there was no link between the evidence of the second warrant and
the first.81 ' The court also ruled that it was not error for the State to
enlist the aid of a nonlaw enforcement officer technician, in this case a
dentist, to execute the search warrant 8 1'
In State v. Morris '31 common sense and good faith salvaged a search
based on a marginal affidavit for a search warrant. The affidavit stated
that a "confidential reliable informant" had given true and correct information in the past. The informant's tips had not previously resulted in
any arrests or convictions, and the investigator's independent investigation produced negligible results.3 18 The court of appeals, nevertheless, determined that the magistrate had a substantial basis for issuing the
warrant.3 '
Calling someone a "concerned citizen," however, does not make it so. In
State v. White,3 20 the affiant referred to an anonymous tipster as a "concerned citizen."'321 The court of appeals noted that the statement was
merely conclusory, giving the magistrate nothing by which to gauge the
credibility of the source, and that there was no other information in the

310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Id.; see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
196 Ga. App. at 42, 395 S.E.2d at 610.
Id. at 41, 395 S.E.2d at 610.
260 Ga. 860, 401 S.E.2d 263 (1991).
Id.
Id., 401 S.E.2d at 266.
Id. at 863, 401 S.E.2d at 266.
198 Ga. App. 441, 402 S.E.2d 288 (1991).
Id. at 442, 402 S.E.2d at 289.
Id. at 443, 402 S.E.2d at 290.
196 Ga. App. 685, 396 S.E.2d 601 (1990).
Id. at 686, 396 S.E.2d at 602.
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affidavit showing the basis of the informant's knowledge. 82 Because the
issuing magistrate had no "'substantial basis for ...

conclud[ing]' that

probable cause existed,"823 the court held that the affidavit was defective,
and not even the good faith of the officer in relying on the issued search
warrant could salvage the search. 2 4
Good faith ventured into a new realm in Hamil v. State.2' The search
warrant in Hamil was issued for the "premises known as Hamil Clearing
and Grading, 9765 Brumbelow Road, Alpharetta, Ga. 30201.. . and...
adjacent buildings and vehicles on said premises. 82 6 Police found contraband in a residential building, rather than the commercial building apparently described. 2 7 Since the warrant also extended to adjacent buildings, and the officers were acting in good faith, the court, relying on
82 8 upheld the
Maryland v. Garrison,
search.2 9
0
In Reeves v. State,33 the search warrant affidavit provided ample probable cause to believe that knives had been used in a child molestation
case, but failed to mention knives in connection with defendant's home.3
The court noted, however, that it was not unreasonable to conclude that
items of continuing utility and legal to own, such as knives, would be kept
at home for a substantial period of time. 82 The court thus held that there
was no staleness or other probable cause problem in a warrant issued
88
eleven months after they were allegedly used in commission of a crime.
While state-certified campus police officers may not execute
powers of
arrest more than 500 yards from campus property,8 4 they may obtain
search warrants for property outside the 500 yard limit.8 85 Anything to
the contrary in Hill v. State,8 3 insofar as it relates to obtaining extraterritorial search warrants, is overruled.8 7 Since the officers executed the
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
on the

Id. at 686-87, 396 S.E.2d at 603.
Id. at 685, 396 S.E.2d at 602 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983)).
Id. at 686-87, 396 S.E.2d at 603.
198 Ga. App. 869, 403 S.E.2d 828 (1991).
Id. at 869, 403 S.E.2d at 828.
Id., 403 S.E.2d at 828-29.
480 U.S. 79 (1987). The Court in Garrison held that "a good-faith mistaken belief
part of the officers that the area being searched is within the scope of the warrant

that is being executed does not mandate suppression." Id. at 88.
329. 198 Ga. App. at 870, 403 S.E.2d at 829.
330. 197 Ga. App. 107, 397 S.E.2d 601 (1990).
331. Id. at 107, 397 S.E.2d at 602.
332. Id. at 108, 397 S.E.2d at 602.

333. Id., 397 S.E.2d at 603.
334. O.C.G.A. § 20-3-72 (1987).

335. State v. Harber, 198 Ga. App. 170, 171, 401 S.E.2d 57, 57 (1990).
336.

193 Ga. App. 280, 387 S.E.2d 582 (1989), overruled in part by 198 Ga. App. 170, 401

S.E.2d 57 (1990).
337. 198 Ga. App. at 173, 401 S.E.2d at 59.
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search warrant in conjunction with county police, the issue of execution
of extra-territorial search warrants by campus police was not reached. 8
Motions to Suppress. It should be remembered that we are not dealing with the Fourth Amendment directly, but rather with an exclusionary
rule.338 The exclusionary rule in Georgia is codified.3 40 In order to utilize
the exclusionary rule in Georgia, there are statutorily required technical
requirements.3 4 In Taylor v. State,34 2 and Ferrell v. State,3 4 the motions
to suppress were properly denied because
the motions did not contain
34
facts but merely conclusory assertions. '

Defendant's Statements. Generally, cases dealing with the admissibility of statements of the defendant (admissions or confessions)"' fall
into three categories: those coming under advice of rights;34" those coming
under determination of voluntariness;3 47 and those in which denial of
Sixth Amendment right to counsel348 (including, but not limited to, those
338. Id.
339. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
340. O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 (1990).
341. O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30(b) (1990) provides in part: "The motion shall be in writing and
state facts showing that the search and seizure were unlawful ... ." Id.
342. 197 Ga. App. 678, 399 S.E.2d 213 (1990). If no facts are stated, the court is not
required to grant an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 679, 399 S.E.2d at 214 (citing Smith v. Hopper, 240 Ga. 93, 239 S.E.2d 510 (1977)).
343. 198 Ga. App. 270, 401 S.E.2d 301 (1991).
344. Id. at 271, 401 S.E.2d at 302-03; 197 Ga. App. at 679, 399 S.E.2d at 214.
345. An "admission" has been defined as "a statement by a party ... which is relevant
[and aids] the case of his adversary." Brooks v. Sascoms, 47 Ga. App. 554, 555, 171 S.E. 222,
223 (1933). They are usually thought of in the context of civil cases and bring to mind all
the additional code sections dealing with admissibility of admissions: O.C.G.A. §§ 24-3-30 to
-38 (1982). Indeed, confusion is added to this area by section 24-3-15, which provides: "The
term 'admissions' usually refers to civil cases. The term 'confessions' usually refers to criminal cases." O.C.G.A. § 24-3-15 (1982). However, a "confession" is an admission that admits
every element of the offense or the main fact, and does not raise a defense. Wells v. State,
247 Ga. 792, 797, 279 S.E.2d 213, 217 (1981) (citing Johnson v. State, 242 Ga. 822, 251
S.E.2d 563 (1979); Robinson v. State, 232 Ga. 123, 205 S.E.2d 210 (1974)). The true test is
whether it is inculpatory or exculpatory. Robinson, 232 Ga. at 126, 205 S.E.2d at 210. Although a somewhat esoteric difference (except to lawyers and judges), it has been held to be
error to charge on "confession" when only an admission has been given. Pressley v. State,
201 Ga. 267, 271, 39 S.E.2d 478, 481 (1946). Lay persons frequently use the terms "confessed" and "plead guilty" interchangeably. It is probably best to just use the term "statements" in a charge to the jury.
346. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
347. O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 (1982) provides: "To make a confession admissible, it must have
been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or
remotest fear of injury." Id.
348. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides:
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cases arising under Edwards v. Arizona"") is an issue. In Metheney v.
State, 5 0 defendant was placed in custody after a traffic accident. Before
his Mirandarights were read, defendant made a voluntary statement that
he was not the driver. Because the statement was made as a result of the
"functional equivalent of express questioning, '3 1 the court held that it
was error to admit the statements because they were obtained in violation
of Miranda.s"' The exculpatory nature of the statement made no difference, "since the state seeks to benefit from the incriminating impact" of
the statement with other conflicting statements. 3a On the facts as
presented, however, the court found the error to be harmless.8 5" Even
constitutional error can be harmless if it is found beyond a reasonable
5
doubt not to have contributed to the Verdict.6
Most noteworthy statement cases in this survey period dealt with the
right to counsel. In Brown v.State,85 the court of appeals held it error to
admit a statement by defendant obtained by an undercover informant
working for police after an indictment had been initiated and after defendant had exercised his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. ss5
"[T]he Sixth Amendment is violated when the State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accused's right to have
counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state [undercover] agent." 58
But that was not the case in Buttersworth v. State,8 50 in which the
State used defendant's father to find out from defendant the location of
the body in a murder case. sss In Buttersworth the court found that the
distinguishing factor was that defendant was only under arrest and upon
questioning had "refused to cooperate, saying he would not be taken adIn all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury ... to be informed of the nature and cause of

the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
Id. (emphasis added).
349. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
350. 197 Ga. App. 882, 400 S.E.2d 25 (1990).

351. Id. at 885, 400 S.E.2d at 28.
352. Id., 400 S.E.2d at 27.

353. Id.
354. Id. at 887, 400 S.E.2d at 29.

355. Id. at 886, 400 S.E.2d at 29 (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986)).
356.

199 Ga. App. 18, 404 S.E.2d 154 (1991).

357.
358.
359.
360.

Id. at 19, 404 S.E.2d at 157.
Id. (citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985)).
260 Ga. 795, 400 S.E.2d 908 (1991).
Id. at 796, 400 S.E.2d at 909.
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vantage of by the investigating special agent."3 61 Thereafter, defendant's
father, acting at the sheriff's request, talked to defendant and obtained
the information without advising defendant of his Miranda rights. s"
Though recognizing that defendant had invoked his Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent, the court noted that no formal charges had been
initiated, and defendant had not asked for counsel.3 3 Therefore, the
court found that there was no right to counsel implicated and that there
was no requirement that defendant's father advise him of his Miranda
rights under these circumstances.36 '
"[Wihere a suspect makes an ambiguous statement ... with reference
to his desire for an attorney, such as 'maybe I should call my attorney,' an
equivocal request for counsel has been made and the request must 3bes
3s6
clarified before proceeding with the interrogation. " " In Byrd v. State
however, the court refused to find that the mere asking by defendant of
the questioning officer
whether he needed an attorney was such an
"equivocal request."'ss7 Nor did the court find an equivocal request in
Harrisv. State,"ss when the defendant said he would talk, but would not
put anything on paper until he talked to an attorney.6 9
In Green v. State,37 0 defendant was required to give a urine sample at
the request of a police officer pursuant to a special condition of his probation. Defendant challenged the results of the test under the Georgia Constitution.3 71 While the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution37 2 applies only to "testimony," the Georgia courts have long
recognized that there is greater protection afforded under the Georgia
Constitution.373 "'[T]he Georgia Constitution has been construed to limit
361. Id. at 796, 797, 400 S.E.2d at 909, 910.
362. Id. at 796, 400 S.E.2d at 909.
363. Id. at 797, 400 S.E.2d at 910.
364. Id. at 797, 798, 400 S.E.2d at 910, 911.
365. Hall v. State, 255 Ga. 267, 270, 336 S.E.2d 812, 816 (1985).
366. 261 Ga. 202, 403 S.E.2d 38 (1991).
367. Id. at 204, 403 S.E.2d at 40-41.
368. 197 Ga. App. 695, 399 S.E.2d 284 (1990).
369. Id. at 696, 399 S.E.2d at 286.
370. 260 Ga. 625, 398 S.E.2d 360 (1990).
371. Id. at 625, 626-27, 398 S.E.2d at 361-62. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 16 provides:
"No person shall be compelled to give testimony in any manner to be self incriminating."
Id. There was no Fourth Amendment challenge. 260 Ga. at 626-27, 398 S.E.2d at 362; see
also Owen v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1366 (11th Ctr. 1982).
372. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "No person...
shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .
" U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
373. Although the word "testimony" is specifically used in the Georgia Constitution, see
GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 16, the term has been construed to mean something else altogether. See Elder v. State, 143 Ga. 363, 85 S.E. 97 (1915); Evans v. State, 106 Ga. 519, 32

19911

CRIMINAL LAW

211

the State from forcing the individual to present evidence, oral or real
... . You cannot force a defendant to act, but you can, under proper
circumstances, produce evidence from his person.' ,71 Nevertheless, the
court upheld this "production of evidence" and adopted the following
rule: "[Tihe use of a substance naturally excreted by the human body
does not violate a defendant's
right against self-incrimination under the
' s7
Georgia Constitution.'
S.E. 659 (1899); Day v. State, 63 Ga. 668 (1879). In Elder and Day, a person was forced to
place a shoe into a track for comparison. Elder, 143 Ga. at 369, 85 S.E. at 98; Day, 63 Ga. at
668. In Evans, a person was forced to reach into a pocket and pull out a gun. Evans, 106 Ga.
at 520, 32 S.E. at 659. This should be examined in historical context. At the time of these
opinions, there was no exclusionary rule in Georgia for unlawful search and seizure. Calhoun
v. State, 144 Ga. 679, 682, 87 S.E. 893, 893 (1916) (citing Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511, 28
S.E. 624 (1897)). Those decisions, Day, Elder, and Evans, appear to be result oriented,
based on bad facts, with no other remedy available. They are not founded on just the Georgia Constitution, but upon an interpretation of the constitution derived from "the common
law principle, 'Nemo tenetur seipsum accusore,' that no man is bound to accuse himself of
any crime or to furnish any evidence to convict himself of any crime." Calhoun, 144 Ga. at
680, 87 S.E. at 893 (citing Marshall v. Reiley, 7 Ga. 367, 370 (1849)). Recently, the court
held that the common law "year-and-a-day rule" in homicide and other death cases is no
longer the law in Georgia, recognizing that it is no longer valid under today's technology.
State v. Cross, 260 Ga. 845, 846, 401 S.E.2d 510, 511 (1991). There is nothing about the
language of GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 16 which requires a construction that the Georgia
Constitution provides greater protection than the Fifth Amendment. See Cross, 260 Ga. 845,
401 S.E.2d 510. Indeed, a common English reading would dictate the contrary. The most
compelling reason for such a continued construction is that which is noted in Creamer v.
State, 229 Ga. 511, 517, 192 S.E.2d 350, 354 (1972), and that, with knowledge of the supreme court's prior rulings, the same language was included in the 1945 constitution. However, as long as the language is construed to mean something other than what it says, we will
continue to have confusion, inconsistency, and tortured opinions such as those in note 374.
We now have an exclusionary rule for unlawful search and seizure. Perhaps it should again
be considered whether the Georgia Constitution provides "greater protection" than the
Fifth Amendment for the same reasons stated in Daniel v. State, 199 Ga. App. 180, 404
S.E.2d 466 (1991), for rejecting a dual state-federal standard for automobile searches. Id. at
181, 404 S.E.2d at 467.
374. 260 Ga. at 627, 398 S.E.2d at 362 (quoting Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 515-17,
192 S.E.2d 350, 353-54 (1972)). However, one can be compelled to speak for identification,
Davis v. State, 158 Ga. App. 549, 552, 281 S.E.2d 305, 309 (1981), but not to give a handwriting exemplar. Armstead v. State, 152 Ga. App. 56, 58, 262 S.E.2d 233, 235 (1979). One
can seemingly be required to give fingerprints (although there does not appear to be a case
in Georgia on this), but not be compelled to place one's shoe in track for comparison. Elder
v. State, 143 Ga. 363, 364, 85 S.E. 97, 98 (1915) (citing Day v. State, 63 Ga. 668 (1879)).
Being required to give inked finger impressions is indistinguishable, in practice if not in
purpose, from placing one's shoe while still on one's foot in a track. The cases on implied
consent seem to try to dodge the issue. See Wessels v. State, 169 Ga. App. 246, 312 S.E.2d
361 (1983); Allen v. State, 254 Ga. 433, 330 S.E.2d 588 (1985). But see Purvis v. State, 129
Ga. App. 208, 199 S.E.2d 366 (1973), which addresses only the United States and not the
Georgia constitutional issue; see also Presnell v. State, 241 Ga. 49, 243 S.E.2d 496 (1978).
375. 260 Ga. at 627, 398 S.E.2d at 362.
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In Christenson v. State,"O the State offered into evidence defendant's
prior custodial statement, which was made concerning another case in
which defendant had pled guilty. 3 " The State argued that by pleading

guilty in the earlier case, defendant waived a Jackson-Denno78 determination on the issue of Miranda compliance and voluntariness concerning
statements made about that case

79
'

The Georgia Supreme Court dis-

reversed.3 80

agreed and
There apparently is no res judicata rule on the admissibility of statements. In Kitchens v. State,8 1 in a previous trial that ended in a mistrial,
the trial court ruled a statement was inadmissible. 8 At the second trial,
the trial court held a Jackson-Denno hearing and ruled the statemerit
admissible."$ The court of appeals found no error.38'
Counsel: Effectiveness of Trial Counsel. The prevalence of the
issue of effectiveness of trial counsel is probably the most obvious trend
during the survey period. Literally dozens of cases deal with the subject
from one aspect or another. While the issue of effectiveness of counsel
usually comes up only after the trial is over, that should not be the case.
It should be incumbent upon the trial judge to inquire at every stage of
the proceedings in every case, and not just those in which such a procedure is required. 86 This is not just a prophylactic measure, but may actually ensure a fairer trial. Indeed, a similar suggestion has been made by
the courts. In McJunkin v. State,8 6 Judge Pope, concurring specially,
noted the confusion resulting from the various challenges to prior counsel's representation at different stages of the appellate or post appellate
procedure and suggested that "[p]erhaps the best procedure would be to
have the trial court determine the effectiveness of counsel as a matter of
course following every criminal trial in this State. '83 In any event, effectiveness of counsel is included at this point in the Article because the
376. 261 Ga. 80, 402 S.E.2d 41 (1991).
377. Id. at 91, 402 S.E.2d at 51.
378. 378 U.S. 368 (1964). In Jackson the Court held that a defendant is entitled to a
state court hearing on the issue of voluntariness of the confession by a body other than the
one trying his guilt or innocence. Id. at 391-96.
379. 261 Ga. at 91, 402 S.E.2d at 51.
380. Id.
381. 198 Ga. App. 284, 401 S.E.2d 552 (1991).
382. Id. at 285, 401 S.E.2d at 553.

383. Id. at 286, 401 S.E.2d at 554.
384. Id.
385. Unified Appeal, Sec. II, (A)(7) and (B)(4), Section III (A), (1)(d), (2)(e) and (3)(c);
and (B)(2)(c) and (3)(c). Ga. Sup. Ct. Rules (1991).
386. 199 Ga. App. 353, 405 S.E.2d 110 (1991).
387. Id. at 353-54, 405 S.E.2d at 111 (Pope, J., concurring specially).
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issue should be broached by the court at about this point in any case in
order to avoid an unfair result or a reversal.
In Cobble v.State,68 the court of appeals found that there was not a
conflict of interest and, therefore, not ineffective counsel merely because
defendant previously had sued his lawyer in federal court. 3" Consequently, the court held that it was not error for the trial court, upon defendant's complaint, to order the public defender to continue. 90 Defendant's subsequent decision to represent himself was a voluntary waiver of
right to counsel.3 91
An over-abundance of lawyers can be as troubling as if there are none.
If the family of the accused hires one lawyer, and the court, doubting his
effectiveness, appoints another, who is lead counsel? What if they each
pursue mutually exclusive defenses: one defense, denial, and the other,
mental illness? What if one counsel suggests staying off the witness stand,
while the other suggests that defendant testify? These are the facts of
Ross v. Kemp,39' which arose on appeal from a denial of the writ of
habeas corpus. Neither counsel "prepared" defendant for cross-examination. As a consequence, the State shot holes in defendant's alibi defense
on cross-examination, thereby damaging his credibility, and defendant
was convicted. 39" The supreme court found ineffective assistance of counsel and reversed . 94 But what will happen on retrial when the defense is

insanity and the State offers into evidence his previous alibi? What
should the trial judge have done? Should he have presumed to designate
one lawyer as lead counsel or sua sponte disqualified the chosen lawyer
because of the judge's doubts? Should he have invaded the sessions in
which counsel did or did not discuss strategy with defendant? Should he
have required each counsel to disclose his theory of the case to ensure
that there was no inconsistency?
Counsel: Indigent Defense. While it is true that indigent defendants do not have a right to pick and choose their own counsel,3 95 when a
defendant's choice of counsel is "'supported by objective considerations'" favoring the appointment of the preferred counsel, "'and there
388. 199 Ga. App. 29, 404 S.E.2d 134 (1991).
389. Id. at 30, 404 S.E.2d at 135-36.

390. Id., 404 S.E.2d at 136.
391. Id.
392. 260 Ga. 312, 393 S.E.2d 244 (1990).
393. Id. at 313, 393 S.E.2d at 245. One might wonder what "preparation" of defendant
would have changed. Should he have been told not to lie about his alibi? His alibi was
unknown to counsel.
394. Id. at 312-13, 393 S.E.2d at 244.
395. Lipham v. State, 257 Ga. 808, 811, 364 S.E.2d 840, 843 (1988) (citing Kesler v.
State, 249 Ga. 462, 291 S.E.2d 497 (1982)).
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are no countervailing considerations of comparable weight, it is an abuse
of sound judicial discretion to deny the defendant's request to appoint
the counsel of his preference.' "" In Davis v. State,3s7 the court also
found error in the trial court's refusal to appoint for the second retrial
(after two reversals) of defendant's death penalty sentencing trial defendant's counsel of choice, Millard Farmer and Carla Friend.398 Farmer had
previously represented Davis without compensation in earlier phases of
the trial. The trial judge would have allowed Farmer to withdraw and
appointed other counsel, but declined to appoint Farmer, in part because
of Farmer's perceived record of "antagonizing the court. 3 99 The trial
judge further noted a federal court policy of not appointing previously
retained counsel.400 The supreme court found that Farmer and Friend
were experienced, familiar with the case, closely associated with defendant, and available.' 01 The negative factors simply were "not of comparable weight.' 402 Justice Hunt concurred in part and dissented in part. 40 8
The right to appointed counsel is not automatic. A defendant has a
right to appointed counsel only if he is indigent; the right may be waived,
however, if the defendant is not diligent. 4 04 In Wood v. State,'40 for instance, defendant evaded the court's inquiries into his financial status.
Defendant also admitted not previously having sought counsel.40 Despite
the absence of an express election, the supreme court held the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant to trial without a
07
lawyer.
396. Amadeo v. State, 259 Ga. 469, 471, 384 S.E.2d 181, 183 (1989) (quoting Harris v.
People, 567 P.2d 750, 759 (1977)).
397. 261 Ga. 221, 403 S.E.2d 800 (1991).
398. Id. at 222, 403 S.E.2d at 801.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 223, 403 S.E.2d at 802 (Hunt & Fletcher, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). In concurring, Justice Hunt noted hypothetical comparable countervailing measures
for future cases: (1) geographical remoteness of defendant's preferred lawyer's office; (2)
court conflict which might cause delay; (3) recent documented pattern of disruptive behavior in court; (4) competent local counsel also has previous connection in case. Id. at 223, 403
S.E.2d at 802. In dissent, Justice Hunt would remand with direction that the trial court
consider appointing both requested attorneys, or one requested attorney and one local attorney. Id. In a footnote to the concurrence, he questioned whether the trial court must defer
to lead defense counsel's request of associate counsel. Id. at 223 n.2, 403 S.E.2d at 802 n.2.
404. Greenhill v. State, 199 Ga. App. 218, 221, 404 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1991); see also
O.C.G.A. § 17-12-1 to -72 (1990).
405. 199 Ga. App. 252, 404 S.E.2d 589 (1991).
406. Id. at 253, 404 S.E.2d at 590.
407. Id. at 254, 404 S.E.2d at 591.
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1

Similarly, in Irby v. State,0 8 the supreme court refused to find error
when the trial court denied funds for an expert.' 0 The court reasoned
that defendant was only marginally indigent, had only marginally shown
a need for an expert witness pathologist, and could have hired an expert
out of his own funds.' 1
Grand Jury. In State v. Byrd,4" after the court discharged the grand
jury, they later met, considered, and returned an indictment. The jurors
were not resumnmoned by the clerk, ordered back into session by the
court, resworn, or recharged. The judge did not attend until later in the
day.' 1 The trial court, therefore, quashed the indictment.' 1 ' The court of
appeals agreed, noting that "[p]ublic confidence and respect for the institution of the grand jury require that it operate only in conjunction with
the institution of the superior court," and held "that a grand jury, properly drawn, duly summoned and sworn and then discharged, may reconvene in the same term only upon order of the superior court and must be
1
recharged.'
1
the court upheld a second indictment when reIn Fields v. State,4
turned by a grand jury, based only on the evidence it heard at the previous presentation of the first indictment.' 1 The first indictment had been
adjudged nolle prosequi because it failed to state the day and month of
the offense.' 17 In the same case, the court also held that the array of the
grand jury could not be challenged simply because four of six jury commissioners were government employees.'41 Finally, in State v. Auer4
9 the court of appeals held that a tabling of an indictment by the
swald,"
408. 260 Ga. 401, 396 S.E.2d 210 (1990).
409. Id. at 402, 396 S.E.2d at 212.
410. Id. at 403-04, 396 S.E.2d at 211.
411. 197 Ga. App. 661, 399 S.E.2d 267 (1990).
412. Id. at 661, 399 S.E.2d at 267.
413. Id. at 662, 399 S.E.2d at 268.
414. Id. at 663, 399 S.E.2d at 269.
415. 260 Ga. 331, 393 S.E.2d 252 (1990).
416. Id. at 332, 393 S.E.2d at 255.
417. Id. But see State v. Williams, 181 Ga. App. 204, 351 S.E.2d 727 (1986), holding that
an indictment must be present (apparently not necessarily a valid indictment if the date is
omitted) for a witness to receive a valid oath. Id. at 206, 351 S.E.2d at 727 (citing Switzer v.
State, 7 Ga. App. 7, 65 S.E. 1079 (1909)).
418. 260 Ga. 332, 393 S.E.2d at 254.
419. 198 Ga. App. 183, 401 S.E.2d 27 (1990).
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grand jury or the "'mere failure of the grand jury to [return an] indict[ment] does not constitute the return of a no bill.' ",420
Indictment. Under the heading of Indictments, there are several of
the usual "allegata vs. probata" problems. 421 In most instances, if the indictment had been properly worded, these problems would not have occurred. In Coursey v. State,"2 the indictment for financial credit card
theft2 8 created an unnecessary venue problem.' Although the indictment alleged that defendant did obtain the card, the evidence indicated
that the card was obtained in another county. 2 1 Therefore, under
O.C.G.A. section 17-2-2(a), the general venue provision'42 the indictment
failed to assert appropriate venue. 7 The problem could have been
avoided by the simple expedient of alleging that defendant obtained and
withheld the card. The State need then only prove that defendant obtained the card in the correct county or withheld the card in the correct
420. Id. at 185-86, 401 S.E.2d at 30 (quoting Nelson v. State, 247 Ga. 172, 174, 274
S.E.2d 317, 321 (1989)) (citation omitted).
421. See, e.g., Dobbs v. State, 235 Ga. 800, 221 S.E.2d 576 (1976); Seabolt v. State, 234
Ga. 356, 221 S.E.2d 576 (1976).
422. 196 Ga. App. 135, 395 S.E.2d 574 (1990).
423. O.C.G.A. § 16-9-31(a)(1) (1988) provides:
(a) A person commits the offense of financial transaction card theft when:
(1) He takes, obtains, or withholds a financial transaction card from the
person, possession, custody, or control of another without the cardholder's
consent; or who, with knowledge that it has been so taken, obtained, or
withheld, receives the financial transaction card with intent to use it or to
sell it or to transfer it to a person other than the issuer or the cardholder.
Id. (emphasis added).
424. O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(a) (1990) provides: "Criminal actions shall be tried in the county
where the crime was committed, except as otherwise provided by law." Id.
425. 196 Ga. App, at 136, 395 S.E.2d at 576.
426. O.C.G.A. § 17-2.2(a) (1990).
427. See infra text accompanying note 460. However, a strong argument, not raised by
the state, nor addressed by the case, could be made that venue was correct. O.C.G.A. § 16-931(b) (1988) provides: "Taking, obtaining, or withholding a financial transaction card without consent of the cardholder or issuer is included in conduct defined in Code Section 16-82 as the offense of theft by taking." Id. (emphasis added).
If this also has the effect of conferring on financial credit card theft the totally different
venue provisions of theft by taking, venue was proper. See O.C.G.A. § 16-8-11 (1988), which
provides: "In a prosecution for [theft by taking] ... the crime shall be considered as having
been committed in any county in which the accused exercised control over the property
which was the subject of the theft." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, even if the property were
actually "obtained" in another county than the county of trial, venue for "obtaining" the
property (not just withholding) would be in any county in which the accused exercised control over the property. See, e.g., Chandler v. State, 138 Ga. App. 128, 225 S.E.2d 726 (1976);
David v. State, 135 Ga. App. 128, 219 S.E.2d 598 (1975); Sanders v. State, 67 Ga. App. 706,
21 S.E.2d 276 (1942).
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county.'"8 Similar remediable problems leading
to reversals occurred in
0
49
Sanchez v. State ' and Talbot v. State.43
In Tarver v. State,'431 the district attorney tried to amend a lost accusation. An accusation, unlike an indictment, may be amended before
trial. 48 2 In this case, however, the original accusation was lost. 4 3 The

docket verified such an accusation had been filed, charging defendant
with "DUI" and "Left of Center," with no detail as to the date of the
offense. The problem arose because the amendment was filed over two
years after the offense and thus would be barred by the statute of limitations, unless it could be shown to be a true amendment to a previously
filed accusation pertaining to this case.'' Since the subject matter of the
first case could not be shown, the State could not prove it to be an
amendment to a previously filed case. 4 ' Therefore, the court found the
amendment barred and dismissed the accusation. 8
Competency/Insanity. After defendant in Talbot v. State4 37 filed
notice of an insanity defense under Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.5,438
the State moved for a psychiatric examination. 48 The trial court found
428. See supra text accompanying note 420.
429. 197 Ga. App. 470, 474, 398 S.E.2d 740, 744 (1990). The State alleged "actual possession" of drugs after the "actual possession" requirement for trafficking in cocaine had been
statutorily removed. However, having alleged actual possession, the State had to "prove actual" possession, and it was error for the judge not to so charge. Id. at 474, 398 S.E.2d at
743.
430. 198 Ga. App. 636, 638, 402 S.E.2d 366, 369 (1991). The indictment alleged aggravated assault with a knife; however, the evidence only described something shiny. Id. at 636,
402 S.E.2d at 367. The court of appeals speculated that if the indictment merely alleged
"offensive weapon," the evidence might have been sufficient, but having alleged a knife, the
court held that the State must prove a knife, which they were unable to do. Id. at 638, 402
S.E.2d at 367-68.
431. 198 Ga. App. 634, 635-36, 402 S.E.2d 365, 365-66 (1991).
432. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-71(f) (1990).
433. 198 Ga. App. at 635, 402 S.E.2d at 365-66.
434. O.C.G.A. § 17-3-1(d) (1990) provides: "Prosecution for misdemeanors must be commenced within two years after the commission of the crime." Id.
435. 198 Ga. App. at 635-36, 402 S.E.2d at 365-66.
436. Id. at 636, 402 S.E.2d at 366.
437. 260 Ga. 527, 397 S.E.2d 439 (1990).
438. UNiw. Sup. CT. R. 31.5 (1991).
439. 260 Ga. at 527, 397 S.E.2d at 439. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-130.1 (1990) provides:
At the trial of a criminal case in which the defendant intends to interpose the
defense of insanity, evidence may be introduced to prove the defendant's sanity or
insanity at the time at which he is alleged to have committed the offense charged
in the indictment or information. When notice of an insanity defense is filed, the
court shall appoint at least one psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine
the defendant and to testify at the trial. This testimony shall follow the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution and for the defense, including testimony
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no independent examination necessary and ordered defendant examined
by a state psychiatrist." 0 The state psychiatrist found defendant had acted under delusional compulsion. The State then moved for, and the
court granted, a second evaluation, leading to this interlocutory appeal."'
The court first noted that "[a] court-appointed medical expert cannot be
classified as an agent of the [S]tate, but must be considered as an independent and impartial witness."'" 2 The court then found that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion.' "
Discovery: Statements of Accused. When a demand under
O.C.G.A. section 17-7-2104" is properly filed, oral statements must be reduced to writing and supplied to the defense; otherwise they are inadmissible." 5 Unfortunately, statements submitted are sometimes incomplete.
A series of cases during the survey period helped flesh out the parameters
of this rule. Summaries of statements have been approved, and the rule
does not require production of the actual videotape of a statement."
of any medical experts employed by the state or by the defense. The medical witnesses appointed by the court may be cross-examined by both the prosecution and
the defense, and each side may introduce evidence in rebuttal to the testimony of
such a medical witness.
Id.
440. 260 Ga. at 527, 397 S.E.2d at 439.
441. Id. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-3 (1988) provides:
A person shall not be found guilty of a crime when, at the time of the act, omission, or negligence constituting the crime, the person, because of mental disease,
injury, or congenital deficiency, acted as he did because of a delusional compulsion
as to such act which over mastered his will to resist committing the crime.
Id.
442. 260 Ga. at 528, 397 S.E.2d at 440.
443. Id. The court further noted that "a contrary rule would make the opinion of the
single expert witness determinative of the issue," contrary to legislative intent in O.C.G.A. §
17-7-130.1. 260 Ga. at 528, 397 S.E.2d at 440.
444. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210(a), (c), (d) (1990) provides:
(a) At least ten days prior to the trial of the case, the defendant shall be entitled to have a copy of any statement given by him while in police custody. The
defendant may make his request for a copy of any such statement, in writing,
within any reasonable period of time prior to trial ....
(c) Failure of the prosecution to comply with a defendant's timely written request for a copy of his statement, whether written or oral, shall result in such
statement being excluded and suppressed from the prosecution's use in its case-inchief or in rebuttal.
(d) If the defendant's statement is oral, no relevant and material (incriminating
or inculpatory) portion of the statement of the defendant may be used against the
defendant unless it has been previously furnished to the defendant, if a timely
written request for a copy of the statement has been made by the defendant ...
Id.
445. Id. § 17-7-210(b).
446. Deal v. State, 199 Ga. App. 184, 186, 404 S.E.2d 343, 344 (1991).
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Sometimes, however, supplied statements omit material details. In Cook
v. State,447 for instance, the statement contained defendant's admissions
concerning the cutting, but omitted his description about lying in ambush." s The court held it error to admit that portion of the statement
dealing with hiding in the bushes, although the error was harmless. 4"
However, in Johnson v. State,"0 the court refused to find error in admitting a statement dealing with the number of blows in an assault, when the
statement submitted to1 defendant described generally multiple blows
over a period of time.4

Nevertheless, in Byars v.State,"' the court determined that a statement sought to be used by the State, concerning a similar previous transaction, but not directly about the case on trial, did not abrogate the
State's necessity of compliance with the rule by providing a copy of the
statement."4 8 Furthermore, an unfurnished statement could not be used
even for impeachment in Davis v. State."' The exclusion provided by the
statute is not, however, absolute. 5 In Adams v. State,'45 when the defense asked a question so broad as to leave the "field wide open for a
47
reply,""1
the court found no error when5 the witness responded with evidence from an unfurnished statment.4
Discovery: Scientific Reports. 45 InConyers v. State,'"0 a traffic fatality case, defendant made certain statements to the treating emergency
199 Ga. App. 14, 404 S.E.2d 128 (1991).
Id. at 17, 404 S.E.2d at 130.
Id.
261 Ga. 236, 404 S.E.2d 108 (1991).
451. Id. at 237-38, 404 S.E.2d at 110.
452. 198 Ga. App. 793, 403 S.E.2d 82 (1991).
453. Id. at 796, 403 S.E.2d at 85.
454. 198 Ga. App. 375, 375, 401 S.E.2d 581, 582 (1991).
455. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210 (1990).
456. 197 Ga. App. 81, 397 S.E.2d 497 (1990).
457. Id. at 82, 397 S.E.2d at 498 (quoting Gaddy v. State, 96 Ga. App. 344, 346, 99
S.E.2d 837, 838).
458. Id.
459. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211(b), (c) (1990) provide:
(b) In all criminal trials, felony and misdemeanor, the defendant shall be entitled to have a complete copy of any written scientific reports in the possession of
the prosecution which will be introduced in whole or in part against the defendant
by the prosecution in its case-in-chief or in rebuttal. The request for a copy of any
written scientific reports shall be made by the defendant in writing at arraignment
or within any reasonable time prior to trial. If such written request is not made at
arraignment, it shall be within the sound discretion of the trial judge to determine
in each case what constitutes a reasonable time prior to trial. If the scientific report is in the possession of or available to the prosecuting attorney, he must comply with this Code section at least ten days prior to the trial of the case.
447.
448.
449.
450.
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room physician. The State sought to offer these statements into evidence.
The State supplied a copy of the emergency room report pursuant to
proper demand, but the statements to the physician were not included. 4
The supreme court held that, although emergency room reports are often
scientific reports, discoverable under the code'46 this was not scientific
evidence and, therefore, was not so discoverable.4"
Pursuant to a demand for scientific reports under the Code,' the defense was not entitled to dental impressions, photographs, and x-rays in
Harris v. State.4 6' The requested materials "did not contain the [scientist's] conclusions and findings, but had to be interpreted by him to attain significance.'"4
Discovery: Subpoena/Motion to Produce."s7 Although the intermediate reports and tests may not be discoverable under the demand for
scientific reports as just noted, they can be obtained through other
means. In Eason v. State," the supreme court granted certiorari to consider whether a defendant has "the right to subpoena all the work product of the State Crime Lab chemist [or other scientist] connected to the
analysis of the alleged [substance].'
Writing for a unanimous court,
Justice Smith concluded that cross-examination is controlled by Georgia
(c) Failure by the prosecution to furnish the defendant with a copy of any written scientific report, when a proper and timely written demand has been made by
the defendant, shall result in such report being excluded and suppressed from
evidence in the prosecution's case-in-chief or in rebuttal.

Id.
460. 260 Ga. 506, 397 S.E.2d 423 (1990).
461. Id. at 508, 397 S.E.2d at 427.
462. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211 (1990).
463. 260 Ga. at 508, 397 S.E.2d at 427.
464. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211 (1990).
465. 260 Ga. 860, 863-64, 401'S.E.2d 263, 267 (1991).
466. Id. at 864, 401 S.E.2d at 267.
467. O.C.G.A. § 24-10-22(a) (1982) provides: "A subpoena may also command the person
to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents, or tangible things designated therein." Id. O.C.G.A. § 24-10-26 (1982) provides:
Where a party desires to compel production of books, writings, or other documents or tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of another party, in
lieu of serving a subpoena under this article, the party desiring the production
may serve a notice to produce upon counsel for the other party ....
The notice
shall be in writing, signed by the party seeking production of the evidence, or his
attorney, and shall be directed to the opposite party or his attorney.
Id.; see also Brown v. State, 238 Ga. 98, 231 S.E.2d 65 (1976).
468. 260 Ga. 445, 396 S.E.2d 492 (1990).
469. Id. at 445, 396 S.E.2d at 493.

1991]

CRIMINAL LAW

law 0 and not by United States v. Owens. 47 1 Noting that in order to conduct cross examination and to pursue impeaching evidence,' 2 the defense
must be able to subpoena certain materials relevant to testing by the expert.4 73 "Those items which may be subpoenaed are limited to those
memos, notes, graphs, computer print-outs, and other data the [expert]
relied upon to support her testimony. and opinion during . . . direct
examination."'' 7
In Walker v. State,47 5 defendant was being tried for a murder as to
which another party had previously been tried and acquitted. Defendant
subpoenaed certain polygraph and statement records of the previous accused to show that there were other suspects with opportunity and motive.' 76 The State moved to quash the subpoena, alleging that such evidence was irrelevant and "not germane to the [defendant's] involvement
in the case."'17 The trial court agreed.47 The supreme court reversed,
holding that, although the evidence sought might have been inadmissible
for other reasons, it was not inadmissible for the reason urged by the
State."' To the extent others were implicated by the materials, the court
found it relevant to defendant's sole defense in that it "makes the inference that someone other than [defendant] committed the crimes more
probable.'4 0 Therefore, the trial court erred in quashing the
81
subpoenas.'
Discovery: Similar Transactions. Service of defendant with a
copy of the State's file, which included evidence of the similar transaction, did not comply with the notice requirements of the Uniform Supe470. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-64 (1982) provides: "The right of a thorough and sifting cross-examination shall belong to every party as to the witnesses called against him. If several parties to the same case have distinct'interests, each may exercise this right." Id.
471. 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988).
472. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-82 (1982) provides: "A witness may be impeached by disproving the
facts testified to by him." Id.
473. 260 Ga. at 446, 396 S.E.2d at 494. "A basic principle of scientific testing is that
careful records of test procedures and results are to be scrupulously maintained. A scientific
test without an accompanying report of the testing environment, number of trials, raw results and analyzed data is in reality no test at all." Id. (quoting Law v. State, 251 Ga. 525,
530, 307 S.E.2d 904, 908 (1983)).
474. Id. at 446-47, 396 S.E.2d at 494.
475. 260 Ga. 737, 399 S.E.2d 199 (1991).
476. Id. at 739, 399 S.E.2d at 201.
477. Id. at 738, 399 S.E.2d at 200.
478. Id. at 738-39, 399 S.E.2d at 201.
479. Id. at 739, 399 S.E.2d at 202.
480. Id. at 740, 399 S.E.2d at 202.
481. Id.
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rior Court Rules.' 8 ' In Story v. State,'8 ' the court of appeals held that
notice must show the State's intent to use the evidence of similar transaction, and it made no
difference that the evidence was offered only to
48
prove bent of mind.

4

There are, however, exceptions to the applicability of the notice requirement. Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3485 does not apply to the
extent that the similar transactions are within the statute of limitations
and would support a conviction of the offense charged. 4 " The notice requirement also does not apply to evidence admitted for the purpose of
showing conduct between the same parties in order to show the relation4
ship of the parties.

87

When the state does give notice, the court must have a hearing to determine the admissibility of the evidence. 488 Nevertheless, the court of
appeals held in McGowan v. State"9 that the hearing need not be an
evidentiary one.4 0 In the discretion of the court, the prosecutor may
merely "state in his place" what the evidence will show."'
Discovery: Other. Confidential files in which there may be found
mitigating or impeaching evidence must be reviewed in camera by the
court on request. 492 Absent a reasonably specific request, however, it was
not error for the court to refuse to conduct an in camera review of the
parole files of persons other than defendant in Stripling v. State,'3 or of

the victim's psychiatric counseling files in Bartlett v. State."'
482. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 31.3 (1991). Rule 31.3 requires the State to give written notice of
similar transactions or occurrences which the State intends to use in evidence. The requirements specify when notice must be given as well as what the notice must include. Id.
483. 196 Ga. App. 590, 396 S.E.2d 547 (1991).
484. Id. at 589-90, 396 S.E.2d at 548.
485. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 31.3 (1991).
486. Murphy v. State, 195 Ga. App. 878, 880, 395 S.E.2d 76, 78 (1990). Compare Story v.

State, 196 Ga. App. 590, 396 S.E.2d 547 (1991).
487. See Towns v. State, 260 Ga. 423, 424, 396 S.E.2d 215, 217 (1990); Thomas v. State,
199 Ga. App. 49, 50, 404 S.E.2d 315, 317-18 (1991).
488. UNIv. SUPER. CT. R. 31.3(B) (1991) provides in part:

The judge shall hold a hearing at such time as may be appropriate, and may
receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to determine the request [to admit

evidence of similar crimes], out of the presence of the jury. The burden of proving
that the evidence of similar transactions ... should be admitted shall be upon
the prosecution....
Id.
489. 198 Ga. App. 575, 402 S.E.2d 328 (1991).
490. Id. at 576, 402 S:E.2d at 330.

491. Id. at 577, 402 S.E.2d at 330.
492. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 61 (1987).
493. 261 Ga. 1, 6, 401 S.E.2d 500, 505 (1991).
494. 196 Ga. App. 174, 175, 396 S.E.2d 31, 32 (1990).
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Severance/Joinder (Counts). In Head v. State,'' the supreme
court created a bifurcated trial procedure for cases in which one count
charges defendant with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.'s In
order to prove the count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,
the State would have to introduce evidence of previous convictions, which
would be immaterial to the other charges, and which would be unduly
prejudicial to defendant. In Kellam v. State,'97 and Cauley v. State,'98

the supreme court confirmed what it had contemplated in Head, that if
one of the counts is felony murder, of which possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon is a predicate offense, the bifurcated procedure contemplated in Head need not be followed.' 9 The court should be careful, however, to give limiting instructions that the prior convictions are to be considered only as to the charge of possession of the firearm.5°°
When counts were charged in separate indictments, the court previously found error in consolidating the indictments for trial absent a defendant's consent, even if evidence of one would be admissible in the
other. °1 That rule was distinguished in Bridges v. State 0° and Langston
v. State.'0 ' Finally, in Smith v. State,'50 the rule established in Bradford
v. State,09 was overruled.50 Judges Carley and Cooper joined Judge
Beasley in dissenting. 0 7
Nolle Prosequi'"8 Apparently, the prosecutor in Davis v. State 0°
had a habit of announcing that a case was nolle prossed. However, he
later failed to live up to the announcement. In Davis the prosecutor orally
announced the case was ready for trial, then later moved to nolle prosequi, which the trial court granted. The district attorney later told defense
counsel that the case would be on the trial calendar. 10 It seems the necessary orders had not been prepared. The trial court was disturbed at the
495. 253 Ga. 429, 322 S.E.2d 228 (1984).

496. Id. at 432, 322 S.E.2d at 232.
497.

260 Ga. 464, 396 S.E.2d 894 (1990).

498. 260 Ga. 324, 393 S.E.2d 246 (1990).
499. 260 Ga. at 465, 396 S.E.2d at 896; 260 Ga. at 325, 393 S.E.2d at 248.
500. 260 Ga. at 465, 396 S.E.2d at 896.

501. Bradford v. State, 126 Ga. App. 688, 689, 191 S.E.2d 545, 546 (1972).
502.

503.
504.
505.
506.
S.E.2d

195 Ga. App. 851, 853, 395 S.E.2d 30, 32 (1990).

195 Ga. App. 873, 395 S.E.2d 74 (1990).
199 Ga. App. 410, 405 S.E.2d 107 (1991).
126 Ga. App. 688, 689, 191 S.E.2d 545, 546 (1972).
199 Ga. App. at 410, 405 S.E.2d at 108. But see Carter v. State, 261 Ga. 344, 404
432 (1991).

507. 199 Ga. App. at 412, 405 S.E.2d at 109 (Carley, Cooper & Beasley, JJ., dissenting).
508. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-3 (1990).

509. 196 Ga. App. 785, 397 S.E.2d 58 (1990).
510. Id. at 786, 397 S.E.2d at 60.
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state's "trifling with the court," and found that the nolle prosequi was
1
11
granted, and entered an order to that effect. The State appealed. 2
The court of appeals sustained the trial judge by presuming that since the
trial court was a court of record, the oral nolle prosequi was recorded in
the record for that day, and the trial court's entry of consent to the nolle
prosequi was conclusive.1 3
B.

Trial

Voir Dire: Disqualifications. A juror may be challenged "for
cause" ' if he is related by blood (consanguinity) or by marriage (affinity)
within the sixth degree.51 This is always mind-boggling to compute, and
cases like Alexander v. State,51 are sometimes of assistance. In Alexander the court held that individuals are related to a spouse and his or her
blood relatives, and are related to their own families by blood or marriage, but are not related to the spouse's relatives who are related to the
7
spouse only by marriage.1
In Lowman v. State,""' the court of appeals held that it was reversible
error for the court not to disqualify for cause all members of an Electric
Membership Corporation ("EMC"), when the EMC was the owner of the
property damaged and, therefore, the victim."' The members of an EMC
are considered the equivalent of stockholders, and it made no difference
that the EMC was not the named prosecutor.8 0 The court did not answer
the question whether relatives of members of the EMC would be disqualified, but it seems implicit in the ruling.5 1 There are counties in this state
where virtually everyone is a member of an EMC.
One cannot help but
52 2
wonder what one would do in such instances.
Law enforcement officers were held to be disqualifiable per se in criminal cases in Hutcheson v. State.2 3 The disqualification was based on "in511. Id. at 787, 397 S.E.2d at 61.
512. Id. at 786, 397 S.E.2d at 60.
513. Id.
514. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-163(b)(4) (1990).
515. Id. § 15-12-135(a).
516. 260 Ga. 870, 401 S.E.2d 7 (1991).
517. Id. at 871, 401 S.E.2d at 9.
518. 197 Ga. App. 556, 398 S.E.2d 832 (1990).
519. Id. at 557, 398 S.E.2d at 832.
520. Id., 398 S.E.2d at 833 (citing Thompson v. Sawnee Elec. Membership Corp., 157 Ga.
App. 561, 562-63, 278 S.E.2d 143, 145 (1981)).
521. Id.
522. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-82(a) (1990) allows the state to move for a change of venue for
indictment where a qualified grand jury cannot be found, but the box must be exhausted
unless the accused consents. Id. There is no specific provision dealing with trials.
523. 246 Ga. 13, 14, 268 S.E.2d 643, 644 (1980).
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herent . . . questions regarding [the officers'] possible bias, fairness,
prejudice or impermissible influence upon jury deliberations . . . . These
questions cannot be erased by a mere subjective, albeit sincere, declaration by the officer that he or she can be fair."5

4
2

In Beam v. State,"5 the

supreme court extended this same disqualification to all employees of the
district attorney's office, -thereby causing a reversal of a murder case."
Beam was a case that was otherwise fault free. Justice Hunt wrote a dissent in which he reiterated the distinction between challenges for cause
and challenges for favor. He would have considered this a challenge for
favor to be decided in the discretion of the judge."'
Voir Dire: Batson.52 The most noteworthy cases concerning Batson
took place outside the state or outside the survey period. Last year, two
Georgia cases held that, under Batson, in order to raise an issue of the
state's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, one had to be a
member of the class against which discrimination was being exercised; for
example, a white defendant could not raise a challenge to the use of pe524. Id. at 14, 268 S.E.2d at 644. It may be a little blunt, but in essence the court held
that officers cannot be trusted when they claim they can be fair to a defendant as jurors,
and a judge is abusing his discretion in believing any officer who so states. Either that, or
the court is concerned about public confidence in the integrity of the court from a standpoint of appearance. This is a proper concern, but we know this is not an overriding concern
to the supreme court. See State v. McCollum, 261 Ga. 473, 405 S.E.2d 688 (1991).
At the time of Hutcheson, police officers had to request to be in the jury box. Since that
time, the law was revised to eliminate the previous exceptions. 1984 Ga. Laws 1697 (codified
at O.C.G.A. § 15-12-1 (1990)). If the General Assembly had wanted to disqualify officers
from criminal jury service, they could easily have done so.
525. 260 Ga. 784, 400 S.E.2d 327 (1991).
526. Id. at 786, 400 S.E.2d at 329. In last year's survey, the authors took Justice Weltner
and the supreme court to task for announcing rulings prospectively, i.e., not applicable as to
the case being decided. See D. Samuel & K. Duffield, Criminal Law and Procedure, 42
MERCER L. Rzv. 141, 149 n.78 (1990). If there were ever a case for a legitimate use of such a
procedure, it was Beam. All other challenges for cause are statutory, and their parameters
can be somewhat discerned. Disqualification of employee's of the district attorney's office is
a judge-made rule, and was entirely unpredictable. What does the future portend? What
about "sheriff's posse" members? What about employees of the victim? Does the same hold
true for the state? Are public defenders and their staff disqualified on motion by the state?
On motion by the defense when the public defender represents a codefendant? As the state
cannot appeal a not guilty verdict, it will not likely ever arise to the level of a challenge for
cause as in Beam, but possibly a challenge for favor could be granted in the court's discretion. See in this connection Wells v. State, 261 Ga. 282, 404 S.E.2d 106 (1991).
527. 260 Ga. at 786, 400 S.E.2d at 328 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
528. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1985). See Adams v. State, 199 Ga. App. 541, 542,
405 S.E.2d 537, 539 (1990), in which an appeal of a case tried before the decision in Batson
is "bootstrapped" into an ineffective assistance of counsel challenge.
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remptory strikes against blacks.""' A Georgia case has not yet held to the
contrary, but Powers v. Ohio5 0 makes it clear that standing does not depend on the defendant's membership in the class against whom the peremptory strikes are exercised.53 1 Skipper v. State3 2 and Congdon v.
State5 38 are no longer controlling, and a member of any race can challenge discriminatory exercise by the state of peremptory strikes against
one's own or another race.''
The obvious question raised by the foregoing is: Can the defense use
their peremptory challenges to exclude jurors because of race? Though
not yet answered on the federal level, s68 the Georgia Supreme Court, in
State v. McCollum,5ss declined to extend Batson and Edmonson v. LeesviUle Concrete Co., 3 7 to the discriminatory use of strikes by the defense.
This leaves the defense with the totally unbridled ability to manipulate
the demographics of the jury.5 83
529. Skipper v. State, 257 Ga. 802, 805, 364 S.E.2d 835, 838 (1988); Congdon v. State,
260 Ga. 173, 391 S.E.2d 402 (1990).
530. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
531. Id. at 1366.
532. 257 Ga. 802, 364 S.E.2d 835 (1988).
533. 260 Ga. 173, 391 S.E.2d 402 (1990).
534. 111 S. Ct. at 1366.
535. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 59-U.S.L.W. 4574 (U.S. June 3, 1991),
reu'g 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990).
536. 261 Ga. 473, 405 S.E.2d 688 (1991). After the survey period, Justices Hunt, Benham, and Fletcher each wrote separate dissents:
537. 111 S.Ct. 2077 (1991).
538. It takes 42 qualified jurors to strike a jury in a felony case. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-160
(1990). The defense has twenty peremptory strikes, almost one-half of the venire and, by
definition, twice as many as the state. Id. § 15-12-165. The defense exercises its strikes last,
thereby not wasting any strikes. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-166 (1990). The defense has the additional
assistance of the judge-created challenges for "cause" of law enforcement officers and who
knows who else. Hutcheson v. State, 246 Ga. 13, 14, 268 S.E.2d 643, 644 (1980); Beam v.
State, 260 Ga. 784, 400 S.E.2d 327 (1991). The state is limited in its use of peremptory
strikes, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1985), while the defense is not. State v. McCollum,
261 Ga. 473, 405 S.E.2d 688 (1991). It would not be race neutral for the state to even try to
balance the defense's discriminatory strikes. Thus the defense can totally eliminate, any
class of citizens approaching 50% of the venire; e.g., in black defendant on white victim
crimes, the defense can and frequently does remove white jurors. In a white defendant on
black victim crime, the defense can and frequently does remove all black jurors. Under such
a system, wherein the total peremptory challenges of state and defense amount to two and
one half times the number of jurors who will serve, the notion of a "jury of one's peers"
consisting of a cross-section of the community is ludicrous. If strikes are not equalized, they
should certainly be vastly reduced in number. This would have the collateral benefit of decreasing cost and juror time, and increasing actual trial time.
Among state courts, even for capital felonies, only California offers the defense more (26)
and five states offer the defense as many as twenty peremptory strikes. Of those, only two
do not give the state equal strikes. All other states have far fewer and/or equal strikes. In
noncapital felonies, Georgia stands alone in the number and the proportion of peremptory
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Another obvious question is: What about discrimination based on sex?
The only cases on this issue in Georgia thus far have been erroneously
decided for lack of standing" or have held that the defendant failed to
show the use of strikes to exclude "women with children" was unconstitutional." Although the Georgia Supreme Court has cautioned against using a raw number analysis,"' the supreme court and court of appeals
have proceeded to do just that by finding that no prima facie case of
discrimination has been made out; this abrogates the necessity of raceneutral explanations by the state."'
Opening Remarks. In Berryhill v. State,"' the supreme court had
previously held that the decision to allow defense council to reserve opening remarks until after the state's case has been presented is a matter
within the trial court's discretion."' Therefore, the trial court had not
abused its discretion in requiring the defense to make its opening remarks at the beginning of trial."' Failure to make opening remarks at the
beginning of the trial operated, therefore, as a waiver.'"
After the decision in Berryhill, the Uniform Superior Court Rules were
adopted." 7 In Mason v. State,"' the trial court also tried to require the
defense to make its opening statement immediately after that of the
State. Defense counsel consequently made no opening statement. The
court of appeals intimated that this was an apparent violation of Uniform

strikes afforded the defense. NATIONAL CsRmtR FOR STATS COURTS, STATE COURT ORGANIZA-

TION 1987, 321-27, table 24 (1988).
539. Potts v. State, 259 Ga. 96, 101, 376 S.E.2d 851, 856 (1989).
540. Woodard v. State, 260 Ga. 825, 826, 400 S.E.2d 311, 312 (1991).
541. Aldridge v. State, 258 Ga. 75, 79, 365 S.E.2d 111, 114 (1988); Brown v. State, 261
Ga. 184, 185, 402 S.E.2d 725, 726 (1991).
542. Brown v. State, 261 Ga. 184, 185, 402 S.E.2d 725, 726 (1991); Solomon v. State, 195
Ga. App. 882, 883, 395 S.E.2d 335, 336 (1990); Jones v. State, 196 Ga. App. 877, 877, 397
S.E.2d 303, 304 (1990).
543. 235 Ga. 549, 221 S.E.2d 185 (1975).
544. Id. at 550, 221 S.E.2d at 187. This is still the only cite under "Opening Statements"
in the Unified Appeal Checklist. Checklist for Unified Appeal, II (B) Opening Statements,
GA. Sup. CT. Rt~ss (1991).
45. 235 Ga. at 553, 221 S.E.2d at 190.
546. Id. at 550-51, 221 S.E.2d at 187-88.
547. 246 Ga. A-1. Implementation of Unified Appeal, effective Aug. 25, 1980.
548. 197 Ga. App. 534, 398 S.E.2d 822 (1990).
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but was harmless in this case since defendant

Evidence: Scientific. The highly publicized case of Caldwell v.
State" ' affirmed the trial court's ruling, in a case of first impression, that
DNA identification evidence was admissible.65 Caldwell is a lengthy
opinion and includes a "'brief genetic and biological primer,'"? which explains in great detail the theory and proper procedure of making a DNA
identification. 5 3 The trial court correctly decided the admissibility of this
new scientific principle under the test set forth in Harper v. State,5 54
namely, whether the technique "has reached a scientific stage of verifiable
certainty," which may be determined from expert testimony, "exhibits,
treatises or the rationale of cases in other jurisdictions."55 5 Due to the
novelty of this type of evidence, the supreme court also held that the trial
court was correct in making a determination of whether the testing itself
was done in an acceptable manner. 5" This is a new area, and there are
many pitfalls. The criminal practitioner would be well advised to become
thoroughly familiar with this opinion in its entirety.55 7
When multiple identical or nearly identical bags of a questioned substance were submitted for analysis to the crime laboratory, in Adams v.
State"' and Sams v. State,55 the court of appeals determined that it was
permissible for the technician to test some of the bags and give a weight

549. UNI. SUPER. CT.R. 10.2 (1991) provides in part: "Defense counsel may make an
opening statement immediately after the state's opening statement and prior to introduction of evidence, or following the conclusion of the state's presentation of evidence." Id.
550. 197 Ga. App. at 536, 398 S.E.2d at 824.
551. 260 Ga. 278, 393 S.E.2d 436 (1990).
552. Id. at 285, 393 S.E.2d at 445.
553. Id. at 279, 393 S.E.2d at 437 (quoting People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643 (County
Ct. 1988)).
554. 249 Ga. 519, 292 S.E.2d 389 (1990).
555. Id. at 525, 292 S.E.2d at 395.
556. Id.
557. For example, the population data used in Caldwell made several unsupported assumptions, randomness being one, in order to make a statistical conclusion as to the
probability of identity. These conclusions were not supported by the evidence and, therefore, weaker data had to be used, weakening the probability of identification. 260 Ga. at
289-90, 393 S.E.2d at 444. A similar objection might be made in a more conventional blood
or bodily substance identification case.
558. 196 Ga. App. 723, 397 S.E.2d 12 (1990); see also Williams v. State, 199 Ga. App.
566, 405 S.E.2d 716 (1991).
559. 197 Ga. App. 201, 397 S.E.2d 751 (1990).
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for' all the bags on the assumption that they were all the same substance.5 60 These rulings are somewhat case specific.
Evidence Implicating Others. While it is not necessary to one's defense to prove that someone else committed the crime, evidence tending
to implicate others in the case is not irrelevant when it may tend to raise
a reasonable doubt concerning the defendant's guilt. In Walker v.
State,' the Georgia Supreme Court found exclusion of this type of evidence to be reversible error.' 82
Evidence: Syndromes. In Hall v. State,'6 the court ruled that when
the State offers evidence of the child abuse accommodation syndrome, it
is error to deny the defense the opportunity to offer evidence or crossexamine on prior instances of molestation or sexual activity on the part of
the victim, in order to explain other possible causes for the behavioral
symptoms exhibited by the child.'" This evidence is limited to that purpose only and should not be admitted for other purposes.
In Jennette v. State,5s" it was not error to deny the defense expert's
proffered testimony on the "lying child syndrome" because determination
of credibility is not beyond the ken of the jury.'"
Evidence: False Allegations. In Shelton v. State, 6 8 the trial court.
did not properly follow the procedure in Smith v. State,"' but instead
excluded evidence of prior false allegations on the part of the victim. The
court of appeals remanded for a post-trial hearing for the trial court to
determine if a reasonable probability of falsity existed. 70 If the answer is
yes, a new trial must be granted. If the determination is negative,
the
71
defense has thirty days to file a new appeal on that matter.'
560. 196 Ga. App. at 724, 397 S.E.2d at 13; 197 Ga. App. at 203, 397 S.E.2d at 754.
561. 260 Ga. 737, 399 S.E.2d 199 (1991).
562. Id. at 739-40, 399 S.E.2d at 202.
563. 196 Ga. App. 523, 396 S.E.2d 271 (1990).
564. Id. at 523, 396 S.E.2d at 271. For more on the child abuse syndrome, see Allison v.
State, 256 Ga. 851, 353 S.E.2d 805 (1987).
565. 196 Ga. App. 525-26, 396 S.E.2d at 273; see also Stancil v. State, 196 Ga. App. 530,
531, 396 S.E.2d 299, 300 (1990).
566. 197 Ga. App. 580, 398 S.E.2d 734 (1990).
567. Id. at 581-83, 398 S.E.2d at 736-37.
568. 196 Ga. App. 163, 395 S.E.2d 618 (1990).
569. 259 Ga. 135, 377 S.E.2d 158 (1989). When the defense offers evidence that the victim made prior allegations of sexual misconduct against other parties, then the court may
not exclude such evidence without making a threshold ruling (outside the presence of the

jury) that there is no reasonable probability of falsity. Id. at 137-38, 377 S.E.2d at 160.
570.

196 Ga. App. at 164, 395 S.E.2d at 620.

571. Id.
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In Ellison v. State,571 the trial court properly followed the Smith procedure, but concluded that there was no reasonable probability of falsity in
the prior allegations. The court of appeals reversed based on the evidence
and defined reasonable probability as "'a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' ",i73
In Spivey v. State, 74 a child molestation case, the court extended the
ruling in Smith to prior false allegations of a nature other than sexual.21
Is such evidence only admissible in sex crime prosecutions? Surely not. If
the Smith and Spivey rulings hold, then every trial will degenerate into
many trials concerning all sorts of extraneous false accusations.
Evidence: Acts of Violence by Third Party Victim. 7 In Cook v.
State,5 7 7 when the defense was denial of the assault, the evidence of prior
acts of violence by the victim against third parties was not admissible. 78
Such evidence was likewise not admissible in Stoudemire v. State,5"'

when the defense was accident.580
Evidence: Similar Transactions. As usual there were dozens of
similar transactions cases. The most elucidating opinion was Judge Beasley's long overdue special concurrence in Johnson v. State. s1 The concurrence points out the confusion of issues that exist in .determining the admissibility of evidence of similar transactions. Judge Beasley urges that
the state be required to declare the purpose of the evidence, not merely
throw in the usual smorgasbord of possibilities'' 2 This will enable the
trial judge to properly gauge admissibility by the application of the bal5
ancing test of undue prejudice versus relevancy to an issue in the case. 3
572. 198 Ga. App. 75, 400 S.E.2d 360 (1990).
573. Id. at 76, 400 S.E.2d at 361 (quoting Lloyd v. State, 258 Ga. 645, 647, 373 S.E.2d 1,
2 (1988)).
574. 197 Ga. App. 11, 397 S.E.2d 588 (1990).
575. Id. at 13, 397 S.E.2d at 589-90.
576. Admissibility of acts of violence by third party victims was forecast in cases of justification, in Lolley v. State, 259 Ga. 605, 607-10, 385 S.E.2d 285, 287-89 (1989); Hill v. State,
259 Ga. 655, 657, 386 S.E.2d 133, 135 (1989). It is now the law, Chandler v. State 261 Ga.
402, 405 S.E.2d 669 (1991).
577. 199 Ga. App. 14, 404 S.E.2d 128 (1991).
578. - Id. at 16, 404 S.E.2d at 128.
579. 261 Ga. 49, 401 S.E.2d 482 (1991).
580. Id. at 50, 401 S.E.2d at 484.
581. 199 Ga. App. 144, 145-46, 404 S.E.2d 455, 456-57 (1991) (Beasley, J., concurring).
582. Id. at 146, 404 S.E.2d at 457 (Beasley, J., concurring). But see Cridiso v. State, 200
Ga. App. 342, 408 S.E.2d 153 (1991). For a case decided after the survey period, see Williams v. State, No. 591A0941 (Ga. Sup. Ct. Nov. 1, 1991).
583. 199 Ga. App. at 145-46, 404 S.E.2d at 456-57 (Beasley, J., concurring). This should
be obvious, and with the prevalence of these cases, should have been clarified before now.
The confusion is compounded by the pattern jury instruction on this issue which merely
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Closing Argument. In Cooper v.State, " it was permissible and not
grounds for a mistrial that the State in closing arguments recalled, over
objection, two unrelated cases involving other defendants who were teenagers like defendant. 88 While it is improper for either counsel to make
reference to the possibility of parole, s8s it was not error for the State to
argue that."defendant's probable future behavior 'indicates a need for the
penalty'" or that
most effective means of incapacitation, i.e., the death
5 87
defendant was an escape risk based on his record.

In Hammond v. State, 8s when the prosecutor brazenly argued that
"[tihere is no life without parole in Georgia[,] [s]o one day he will be a
throws into one pot all the possible reasons for consideration of similar transactions. Both
the bar and the bench are using the pattern instruction for authority without thinking. The
charge reads in part as follows: "[A]ny evidence . . .with reference to any other alleged
offense... is admitted ... solely and only under the provision of law that where knowledge, common design, modus operandi, motive, intent, good or bad faith, bent of mind, plan,
scheme and course of conduct, identity, or other matters dependent upon a person's state of
mind, are involved as material elements in the offense for which he is on trial, evidence of
defendant's conduct, with reference to similar transactions ... is admitted solely for the
jury to consider only as it might tend to illustrate the defendant's state of mind ......
Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Volume II, Criminal Cases, State of Georgia, by
Council of Superior Court Judges of Georgia, p. 33-34. This charge, which is a jumbled mess,
comes from several cases, is rarely applicable to the facts of the individual case, and causes
confusion.
For example, "plan" or "scheme" is never an "element in the offense" unless the offense is
conspiracy. Rather it is evidence by which one tries to prove intent or knowledge. Basically,
all of the elements which must be proved by similar transactions can be boiled down to: (1)
identity or (2) knowledge or intent. Therefore, the charge should be rewritten to read:
"[E]vidence of transactions, similar in terms of common design, modus operandi, plan,
scheme and course of conduct is admitted solely for your consideration as it relates to (identity of the perpetrator) (knowledge or intent of the defendant) ... ." One could easily see
that proof that one committed an armed robbery 10 years earlier in Miami with a codefendant might have little legitimate relevancy to the identity of a similar robbery in Atlanta with
a different codefendant, but it might very well be relevant to knowledge or intent if the
defendant had made a statement that he was an unknowing participant. It would be virtually impossible for a trial judge to perform an accurate balancing test without being able to
articulate the real purpose for which the evidence is offered. The charge should be adjustable and adjusted accordingly.
584. 260 Ga. 549, 397 S.E.2d 705 (1990). "'Counsel may bring to his use ... well-established historical facts and may allude to such principles of divine law ...as may be appropriate.'" Id. at 550, 397 S.E.2d at 706 (quoting Conner v. State, 25 Ga. 113, 122, 303 S.E.2d
266, 276 (1983)); see also Carroll v. State, 143 Ga. App. 230, 237 S.E.2d 703 (1977).
585. 260 Ga. at 530, 397 S.E.2d at 706.
586. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76(a) (1990) provides: "[N]o attorney shall argue to or in the presence of the jury that a defendant, if convicted, may not be required to suffer the full penalty
...because [of] pardon [or] parole.. . ." Id.
587. Spencer v. State, 260 Ga. 640, 653, 398 S.E.2d 179, 190 (1990) (quoting Ross v.
State, 254 Ga. 22, 34, 326 S.E.2d 194, 205 (1985)).
588. 260 Ga. 591, 398 S.E.2d 168 (1990).
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free man" in a death penalty sentencing trial, defense counsel merely objected and asked for remedial instructions, which the court granted.5'
Therefore, it was not error for the trial court to fail to grant a mistrial
when none was requested. 90 The State won the battle, but could easily
lose the war on review of effective assistance of counsel. 5 '
Charge of the Court: General. Loose lips sink ships! This was good
advice during World War II, and it is good advice to a trial judge. In
Edmonds v. State,52 the trial judge succumbed to the temptation (as we
all have) of trying to break up the boredom for the jury panels during a
lull. In doing so, he explained plea bargaining, prior records generally,
and other subjects on and off the record. While finding such effort to enlighten and educate the citizenry commendable "under different circumstances," and while not questioning the good intentions of the judge, the
court of appeals held the comments to create reversible error."
In making objections to charges, or in not making them, defense counsel need to be precise. In Towns v. State5 4 and Jones v. State,"6 defense
counsel were held not to have reserved their objections as they obviously
intended, but to have waived objections to the instructions given.5" In
both instances, when asked whether there were objections, defense counsel responded with words to the effect of "not at this time."' 7 Such language has been construed to be a waiver.
Going one step further, Thomas v. State" held that defense counsel
"'must either state his objections or reserve his right to object on motion
589. Id. at 598-99, 398 S.E.2d at 174-75.
590. Id. at 599, 398 S.E.2d at 175. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76(b) (1990) provides:
If counsel for either side in a criminal case argues to or in the presence of the
jury as provided in subsection (a) of this Code section, opposing counsel shall have
the right immediately to request the court to declare a mistrial, in which case it
shall be mandatory upon the court to declare a mistrial. Failure to declare a mistrial shall constitute reversible error.
Id.
591. If defense counsel had made a motion for mistrial based on the prosecutor's statement, one would have been mandatory. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-76(b) (1990). It is almost inconceivable that a prosecutor trusted with as difficult and complex a case as Hammond would not
know better than to make such an argument, leading one to the seemingly inexorable conclusion that it was intentional misconduct. If intentional, then a subsequent retrial on the
death penalty may have been barred. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964); United
States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1975).
592. 196 Ga. App. 190, 395 S.E.2d 566 (1990).
593. Id. at 195, 395 S.E.2d at 570.
594. 260 Ga. 423, 396 S.E.2d 215 (1990).
595. 195 Ga. App. 868, 395 S.E.2d 69 (1990).
596. 260 Ga. at 424, 396 S.E.2d at 218; 195 Ga. App. at 869, 395 S.E.2d at 71.
597. 260 Ga. at 425, 396 S.E.2d at 217; 195 Ga. App. at 869, 395 S.E.2d at 70.
598. 199 Ga. App. 49, 404 S.E.2d 315 (1991).
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for new trial or on appeal'" if asked.'" He "cannot elect to object at trial
to some of the charges and reserve his right to object to additional
charges later. . . [he] must make all of his objections immediately or else
he must reserve his right to object until later. He cannot do both." ' 0
In Butts v. State,0 1 the court of appeals held that reserving objections
will preserve any appellate points for the record concerning a charge
given or not given, but it will not preserve an objection to a judge's intimating an opinion as to what has been proved, in violation of the Code.' 0
When the jury asked the judge in Grimes v. State'0 s to recharge on all
possible verdicts, the court did so. There was a multitude of offenses and
lesser included possible verdicts. Unfortunately, the court neglected to
reinstruct the jury about not guilty and its underlying principles as one of
the options. The court also provided a written excerpt of the charge to
the jury over objection; both of these constituted reversible error.6 0 '
In an interesting concurrence in Bentley v. State,s05 Justice Weltner
suggests the entire trial procedure should be rearranged. It would be better practice for the court to give a substantial charge as to most issues at
the commencement of trial. After the evidence is closed, the court would
give the main charge to the jury, followed by argument of counsel. Finally, the court would give brief instructions about the verdict.' 0 '
599. Id. at 53, 404 S.E.2d at 319 (quoting Laster v. State, 196 Ga. App. 854, 397 S.E.2d
191 (1990)). This is a bad rule in that it penalizes counsel who might actually otherwise be
inclined to correct an inadvertent error by the court. Counsel now would almost always be
foolish to do anything other then "reserve objections." From a policy standpoint, such a rule
is indefensible; see also Grissett v. State, 199 Ga. App. 547, 405 S.E.2d 542 (1991).
600. 199 Ga. App. at 53, 404 S.E.2d at 319-20.
601. 198 Ga. App. 368, 401 S.E.2d 763 (1991).
602. Id. at 369, 401 S.E.2d at 765. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 (1990) provides:
It is error for any judge in any criminal case, during its progress or in his charge
to the jury, to express or intimate his opinion as to what has or has not been
proved or as to the guilt of the accused. Should any judge violate this Code section, the violation shall be held by the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals to be
error and the decision in the case reversed, and a new trial granted in the court
below with such directions as the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals may
lawfully give.

Id.
603. 199 Ga. App. 152, 404 S.E.2d 324 (1991).
604. Id. at 153-54, 404 S.E.2d at 326-27. Note, however, that an objection to sending a
written charge to the jury is procedural, not substantive, and, therefore, may not be reserved
by a general reservation of objections to the charge. Anderson v. State, 199 Ga. App. 595,
596, 405 S.E.2d 504, 507 (1991).
605. 261 Ga. 229, 231, 404 S.E.2d 101, 103 (1991) (Weltner, J., concurring).
606. Id. at 231, 404 S.E.2d at 103 (Weltner, J., concurring).
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Charge of the Court: Lesser Included Offenses. In Peebles v.
State,'07 the supreme court made short work of denying appellant's contention that the trial court erred in failing to charge false imprisonment
as a lesser included offense of kidnapping." The court held that when
"the evidence shows either the ... completed offense ... or ... no offense, the trial court is not required to charge the jury on a lesser included offense."" All justices concurred except Weltner, who did not
participate. 10
The court of appeals made similar decisions in Millis v. State,6"
Brooks v. State, 12 and Sims v. State.s15 Approximately a month after the
decision in Peebles was handed down, the supreme court decided State v.
Alvarado.6 " In that case, the supreme court expressly overruled the language in Leeks v. States" and similar cases. The rule stated in Alvarado
is that "a written request to charge a lesser included offense must always
is guilty of the lesser
be given if there is any evidence that the defendant
0 17
included offense." 1 All the justices concurred.
Charge of the Court: Equal Access/Presumption of Possession. Previously, in Lance v. State,'18 the court held that there was no
error in failing to give the "equal access" charge when under the circumstances, there was no presumption of ownership.6 1 This proposition was
607. 260 Ga. 430, 396 S.E.2d 229 (1990).
608. Id. at 433, 396 S.E.2d at 232. Kidnapping, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40 (1988), differs from
false imprisonment, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41 (1988), only as to the asportation element, which is
present in kidnapping and absent in false imprisonment.
609. Id. at 433, 396 S.E.2d at 232 (citing Hambrick v. State, 174 Ga. App. 444, 330
S.E.2d 383 (1985)).
610. Id.
611. 196 Ga. App. 799, 397 S.E.2d 71 (1990) (robbery by intimidation requested in an
armed robbery case, differing only in the presence or use of an offensive weapon).
612. 197 Ga. App. 194, 397 S.E.2d 622 (1990) (simple battery requested in a child molestation case differing only in the presence or absence of an intent to satisfy sexual desires).
613. 197 Ga. App. 214, 398 S.E.2d 244 (1990) (theft by taking requested in an armed
robbery case, differing only in the taking from the person).
614. 260 Ga. 563, 397 S.E.2d 550 (1990).
615. 188 Ga. App. 625, 373 S.E.2d 777 (1988). Leeks held: "It is never error for a trial
court to refuse to charge on a lesser included offense even though requested in writing when
the evidence does not reasonably raise the issue that the defendant may be only guilty of
the lesser crime." Id. at 628, 373 S.E.2d at 780 (emphasis added).
616. 260 Ga. at 564, 397 S.E.2d at 551.
617. Id. It seems now that if requested, any and every lesser included offense must be
given because by definition, having proved the greater offense, the lesser offense would also
be proved by the evidence. The only exception will be lesser offenses that have differing or
exclusive elements, e.g., voluntary manslaughter need not be given in a murder case if there
is no evidence of provocation. There are still plenty of questions in this area.
618. 191 Ga. App. 701, 382 S.E.2d 726 (1989).
619. Id. at 703, 382 S.E.2d at 729.
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reiterated in Barnwell v. State M and Kan v. State.21 The court of appeals also held in Bozeman v. State622 and Ancrum v. State"8 that the
equal access charge is unnecessary when all persons allegedly having
"equal access" to the contraband are alleged to have been in joint possession of the contraband."2

In Ancrum, however, when possession was the central issue of the case,
the court found reversible error in the trial court's failure to charge on
"actual possession and constructive possession," with or without a request.2 5 Likewise, in Walden v. State 26 failure to give, upon request of

defendant, the charge of presumption of possession when the sole defense
defendant was merely a passenger was held to be reversible
was that
7
error.

2

Charge of the Court: Recent Possession. The charge and concept
of inference of guilt, in theft or theft related (e.g., burglary and robbery)
offenses, from recent possession of goods stolen in the theft survived another round of challenges for a multitude of reasons in Dearmore v.
State.62 Possibly, the right challenge has not yet been made. Recent possession is a particularization of circumstantial evidence and should be
subject to the same challenge as that made against the flight charge.
Charge of the Court: Flight. The time honored and time dishonored charge on flight was abolished prospectively in Renner v. State,6 s
even when requested by the defense in Yarbrough v. State."0 This is a
620. 197 Ga. App. 116, 397 S.E.2d 717 (1990).
621. 199 Ga. App. 170, 404 S.E.2d 281 (1991).
622. 196 Ga. App. 743, 397 S.E.2d 30 (1990).
623. 197 Ga. App. 819, 399 S.E.2d 574 (1990).
624. 196 Ga. App. at 744, 397 S.E.2d at 32; 197 Ga. App. at 821, 399 S.E.2d at 576.
625. 197 Ga. App. at 822, 399 S.E.2d at 577 (citing Lockwood v. State,'257 Ga. 796, 364
S.E.2d 574 (1988)).
"The law recognizes two kinds of possession, actual possession and constructive
possession. A person who knowingly has direct physical control over a thing at a
given time is in actual possession of it. A person who, though not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise
dominion or control over a thing is then in constructive possession of it."
Id., 364 S.E.2d at 575-76 (quoting Lockwood, 257 Ga. at 797, 364 S.E.2d at 575-76).
626. 196 Ga. App. 844, 397 S.E.2d 182 (1990).
627. Id. at 845, 397 S.E.2d at 183.
628. 196 Ga. App. 865, 867-69, 397 S.E.2d 200, 203-05 (1990).
629. 260 Ga. 515, 518, 397 S.E.2d 683, 687 (1990). Because of the concurrence of Justice
Bell, joined by Justices Weltner and Hunt, in Cameron v. State, 256 Ga. 225, 227, 345
S.E.2d 575, 578 (1986), this ruling was predictable. See D. Samuel & K. Duffield, Criminal
Law and Procedure,42 MERcER L. Rxv. 141, 148 (1990). Justice Weltner and the court are
roundly criticized for announcing new rules which will be applicable to the next case, not
the case being decided.
630. 261 Ga. 169, 171, 402 S.E.2d 716, 717 (1991).
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troubling decision, not so much because flight was a valuable charge5s '
but because it leaves so many questions about what will become of similar
charges such as recent possession. ss In abolishing the charge, the court is
adopting Justice Bell's concurrence in Cameron v. States" by finding that
the charge is a "particularization of the general charge on circumstantial
evidence, and. . . carries with it the potential of being interpreted by the
jury as an intimation of opinion by the court that there is evidence of
flight and that the circumstances of flight imply. . . guilt." 4 Justice Bell
further noted that "the trial court does not give specific charges on other
circumstances from which guilt or innocence may be inferred," although
several such charges readily come to mind. 5"
Charge of the Court: Mistake of Fact. The supreme court in Adcock v. State"' held that even when it is not the sole defense, the court
must charge on "mistake of fact"17 when it is requested and
appropriate.1"
631. Flight is merely a common sense charge that can as easily be argued by the state
rather than be charged by the court. It is hard to fault the statement by Justice Bell in
Cameron that criminal charges are "overlong and abstruse" and should be shortened, and
that the charge on the flight is "unnecessary." 256 Ga. at 228, 345 S.E.2d at 578. In so
noting, however, he further stated that the charge is "technically correct." Id. If the charge
is "technically correct" it should not be reversible unless improperly used, which heretofore
has been the usual problem. The charge was "abused" by the state and the courts by giving
it every time the defendant was not found at the scene of the crime. See Renner, 260 Ga. at
519, 397 S.E.2d at 687 (Clarke & Smith, JJ., dissenting). It appears that the supreme court
has merely grown tired of line drawing as to when the charge is appropriate and not
appropriate.
632. Suggested PatternJury Instructions, Volume II, Criminal Cases, State of Georgia
by Council of Superior Court Judges of Georgia p. 125-26 (4).
633. 256 Ga. at 227-28, 345 S.E.2d at 578 (Bell J., concurring).
634. Id. at 227, 345 S.E.2d at 578.
635. Id. at 228, 345 S.E.2d at 578. The court frequently gives other such "particularizations." Omitting "particularizations" that may also be limiting instructions, such as "similar
transactions," there are several state requested particularizations often given. The most obvious is "recent possession." The defense often requests and the court often gives the charge
on "mere presence at the scene of the crime" and "guilt by association." Indeed, what is the
charge on the "defense of good character" but the ultimate particularization of circumstantial evidence, albeit a sometimes required charge?
636. 260 Ga. 302, 392 S.E.2d 886 (1990).
637. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-5 (1988) provides: "A person shall not be found guilty of a crime if
the act or omission to act constituting the crime was induced by a misapprehension of fact
which, if true, would have justified the act or omission." Id.
638. 260 Ga. at 302, 392 S.E.2d at 886. Adcock disapproved Abeman v. State, 185 Ga.
App. 278, 363 S.E.2d 764 (1987); Carswell v. State, 171 Ga. App. 455, 320 S.E.2d 254 (1984);
Adcock v. State, 194 Ga. App. 627, 391 S.E.2d 438 (1990). ("When mistake of fact is not the
sole defense, it is not error to refuse to charge on mistake of fact.")
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Jury Misconduct. In Evans v. State,'" a juror, who previously knew
defendant, was selected, but indicated she could be fair. After deliberations began, other jurors notified the court that the juror was improperly
trying to influence the jury. The juror was questioned, and she denied
such conduct. Nevertheless, she was removed by the court. The other jurors were not questioned about the matter."0 The court of appeals, therefore, reversed." 1 Against the presumption of prejudice from an irregularity in the conduct of a juror, the court found that the State had not
carried its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that there was
64
no harm. 1
C. Sentencing
At a sentencing hearing in Hammond v. State,6 ' the State was not precluded from offering as evidence in aggravation of punishment the facts
of a prior offense that had been nolle prossed pursuant to a plea agreement on other charges." In Jackson v. State, ' defendant was convicted
7
of vehicular homicide, 6 which was predicated upon reckless driving.6
The same reckless driving which caused the death also injured a third
party, who was not the direct victim of the vehicular homicide."6 Since
reckless driving was an essential element of the vehicular homicide, it was
not error for the court to order, as a condition of probation, restitution to
the injured third party who was a victim of the included reckless
driving.6 4'
A conviction and suspended sentence for abandonment can have child
support provisions modified." 0 A modification is not barred by res judicata when the circumstances have. changed." 1 Furthermore, since the
child support condition of suspension of the sentence is neither part of
the sentence nor a punishment, it is not improper to use the child support guidelines 663 in computing the amount of support.6 8
639.
640.
641.
642.

196 Ga. App. 1, 395 S.E.2d 342 (1990).
Id. at 1-2, 395 S.E.2d at 343.
Id. at 2, 395 S.E.2d at 343.
Id.

643. 260 Ga. 591, 398 S.E.2d 168 (1990).

644. Id. at 597, 398 S.E.2d at 174.
645.
646.

198 Ga. App. 261, 401 S.E.2d 289 (1990).
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-393(a) (1991).

647. Id. § 40-6-390.
648.

198 Ga. App. at 263, 401 S.E.2d at 291.

649. Id.
650. O.C.G.A. § 19-10-1(b), (j) (1991).
651.

Vogel v. State, 196 Ga. App. 514, 396 S.E.2d 262 (1990).

652. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(b)(5) (1991).
653. Vogel, 196 Ga App. at 516, 396 S.E.2d at 264.
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At the commencement of trial in Wade v. State,"' a retrial of a death
penalty sentencing, the trial court gave preliminary instructions to the
jury that another jury had found defendant guilty and also instructed the
jury that "you will not be considering the issue of guilt or innocence. '
The supreme court found no error,66s but Justice Clarke dissented on this
issue." 7 Justice Hunt, with Justice Smith joining, concurred because defendant did not object.6" Defendant's reservation of objections at the end
of trial did not preserve the matter because the Unified Appeal", does
not allow objections to be reserved in a death penalty sentencing trial." 0
Justice Hunt further noted that these were preliminary instructions to
which a reservation of objections may not apply.6 1 Finally, Justice Hunt
recommended that Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. 2, Criminal Cases" 2 be revised to include pattern preliminary instructions on
death penalty sentencing retrials. 6"
D. Post Trial (Motion for New Trial/Appeal)
State's Appeal. The court of appeals held in State v. Jones,6 " that
the State cannot appeal a directed verdict of acquittal, even if erroneously granted."" In State v.Seignous, es" the trial court granted a new
trial because of a "fatal variance between allegata and probata," and the
court of appeals held that regardless of the nomenclature "new trial," the
trial court's actions were tantamount to a directed verdict of acquittal." 7
Therefore, the State could not appeal. s "
The state may appeal an adverse ruling in a pretrial motion to exclude
evidence that was unlawfully obtained." In State v. McKenna, 70 the
654. 261 Ga. 105, 401 S.E.2d 701 (1991).
655. Id. at 107, 401 S.E.2d at 704.
656. Id.
657.

Id. at 110, 401 S.E.2d at 706 (Clarke, J., dissenting).

658. Id., 401 S.E.2d at 705-06 (Hunt & Smith, JJ., concurring).
659. Unified Appeal, Outline of Proceedings, Par. 9-12 § (B)(3)(a), GA. SUP. CT. RuLEs
(1991).
660. 261 Ga. at 109-10, 401 S.E.2d at 705-06 (Hunt & Smith, JJ., concurring).
661. Id. at 109-10 n.4, 401 S.E.2d at 705-06 n.4 (Hunt & Smith, JJ., concurring).
662. Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Volume II, Criminal Cases, State of Georgia
by Council of Superior Court Judges of Georgia.
663. 261 Ga. at 109, 401 S.E.2d at 705 (Hunt & Smith, JJ., concurring).
664. 197 Ga. App. 353, 398 S.E.2d 865 (1990).
665. Id. at 353, 398 S.E.2d at 866.
666. 197 Ga. App. 766, 399 S.E.2d 559 (1990).

667. Id. at 766-67, 399 S.E.2d at 560.
668. Id. at 767, 399 S.E.2d at 560.
669. O.C.G.A. § 5-7-1(4) (1991); State v. Brown, 185 Ga. App. 701, 365 S.E.2d 865 (1988);
State v. Strickman, 253 Ga. 287, 319 S.E.2d 864 (1984).
670. 199 Ga. App. 206, 404 S.E.2d 278 (1991).
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trial court excluded the evidence because it had been altered, not because
it was illegally seized. Therefore, the State's appeal was not authorized by
71
law and was dismissed.
Appeal Waived. In Mergel v. State,7 2 a procedural nightmare of a
case, the court of appeals affirmed defendant's conviction based on his
negotiated plea in which he gave up his right to appeal for a reduced
sentence."

Remand. In Ponder v. State s 74 the court of appeals remanded the
case to the trial court for a post trial, in camera hearing consistent with
Moore v. State,' 6 to determine whether the identity of the informant
should have been disclosed .67 The court held a Moore hearing in camera,
with the district attorney present and examining the informant; it was
not error nor was defendant denied confrontation by the exclusion of defendant and defendant's counsel from the hearing." To hold otherwise
would necessarily require disclosure of the informant's identity.6 7 8
In a seldom used, but useful procedure, the court of appeals in Talbot
v. State 7 9 reversed a conviction of armed robbery but then remanded,
giving the trial court the option of sentencing for robbery by intimidation
671. Id. at 207, 404 S.E.2d at 279.
672. 198 Ga. App. 759, 402 S.E.2d 800 (1991).
673. Id. at 760, 402 S.E.2d at 801. The supreme court had previously ruled similarly in
Thomas v. State, 260 Ga. 262, 392 S.E.2d 520 (1990), a nondeath penalty case:
Inasmuch as a criminal defendant may forfeit his right to appeal by his conduct,
there can be no public policy that would forbid a criminal defendant from making
a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of the same right. Furthermore there
is no constitutional or statutory provision that prohibits a criminal defendant
from waiving his statutory right to appeal. Thus. the right to appeal may be
waived.
Id. at 264, 392 S.E.2d at 522. The court further noted that O.C.G.A. § 17-10-35 (1990) mandates review of death penalty cases. Therefore, appeal could not be waived where the death
penalty was imposed. 260 Ga. at 264, 392 S.E.2d at 522.
674. 197 Ga. App. 21, 397 S.E.2d 596 (1990).
675. 187 Ga. App. 387, 379 S.E.2d 511 (1988). A Moore hearing is required on remand
when the trial judge fails to make a proper balancing decision under Roviaro v. United
States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) and Thornton v. State, 238 Ga. 160, 231 S.E.2d 729 (1977), as to
whether an informant's identity must be disclosed. The purpose of the hearing is to determine whether the error is prejudicial and requires disclosure to the court of the identity of
the informant as well as other in camera proceedings.
676. 197 Ga. App. at 22, 397 S.E.2d at 598.
677. Id. at 22-23, 397 S.E.2d at 597.
678. Id. at 23, 397 S.E.2d at 598.
679. 198 Ga. App. 636, 402 S.E.2d 366 (1991); see also Burcher v. State, 247 Ga. 180, 274
S.E.2d 455 (1981).
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rather than conducting a new trial. 80 It is unclear whether this procedure
is limited to cases in which the court remands specifically with that
option.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims. Perhaps the most predominant trend of the year, though certainly not new, was the ever increasing number of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, arising at
every stage of various types of proceedings. In possibly the most unusual
case, the supreme court on its own motion remanded Hammond v.
State,"'1 a death penalty case, to the trial court for a hearing on ineffec6 2
tive assistance of counsel. The matter had not been raised on appeal.
This is authorized under the Unified Appeal Procedure." Justice Smith
wrote a scathing dissent, referring to the remand as "a travesty of justice,
a waste of judicial resource, and an insult to the victims. '6 8 ' Although

possibly true, such a review is inevitable due to the trend and facts of this
case. Therefore, the sooner the better.
When the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel was raised in
DeLoach v. State,s8 the court held that it was error not to conduct an
evidentiary hearing on the issue of appointment of substitute counsel, so
that the matter could be properly aired.6s This case was also remanded
for such a hearing. 87
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is waived if it is not raised
"at the earliest practicable moment." " It is also waived if the defendant
does not ask for an evidentiary hearing. "8 There were several cases which
tried to interpret these holdings with reference to appointment of new
counsel and other factors. s0 In Ponder v. State,so1 the supreme court held
that the issue of effective assistance must be brought up, or else waived,
680. 198 Ga. App. at 638, 402 S.E.2d at 369. The State had proved robbery by intimida-

tion but had failed to prove the existence of a knife as alleged in the indictment. Id.
681. 260 Ga. 591, 398 S.E.2d 168 (1990).
682.
683.
Unified
684.
685.
686.

Id. at 599, 398 S.E.2d at 175.
Unified Appeal Procedure § I (A) (1) and (2), Georgia Court and Bar Rules 9-3, and
Appeal Procedure (B) (1), Georgia Court and Bar Rules 9-15 (1989).
260 Ga. at 600-603, 398 S.E.2d at 175-79 (Smith, J., dissenting).
198 Ga. App. 880, 403 S.E.2d 866 (1991).
Id. at 882, 403 S.E.2d at 867.

687. Id.
688. Thompson v. State, 257 Ga. 386, 388, 359 S.E.2d 664, 665 (1987); Smith v. State,
255 Ga. 654, 656, 341 S.E.2d 5, 7 (1986).
689. Dawson v. State, 258 Ga. 380, 369 S.E.2d 897 (1988).
690. Weems v. State, 196 Ga. App. 429, 431, 395 S.E.2d 863, 865 (1990) (holding that
Dawson did not apply where new counsel did not represent the defendant at the motion for

new trial wherein the issue of effective assistance was not raised); see also Hulett v. State,
198 Ga. App. 89, 400 S.E.2d 366 (1990).
691. 260 Ga. 840, 400 S.E.2d 922 (1991). The supreme court discussed the history and
policy of this line of cases.
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in a motion for out-of-time appeal.192 In such a case, the grant of an out"of-time appeal will also include the right to proceed with a motion for
new trial, at which an evidentiary hearing on the matter may be held."e
These cases are potentially a procedural snake pit in that it is very easy
to inadvertently waive the issue of ineffective assistance of previous
counsel.6"
IV. MISCELLANEOUS
A.

Forfeiture

In State v. Jackson,6'" a case of first impression, the court of appeals
allowed the State to condemn a one-half undivided interest in a vehicle
where one of two co-owners of the one-half undivided interest in the vehicle successfully defended her innocent claim to the vehicle.6" The court
held the property may be forfeited to the extent of wrongdoer's interest,
and may *not be forfeited to the extent of the interest of the innocent
owner, except where the innocent owner fails to contest the forfeiture in
the usual case. s 7 It should be noted that the General Assembly entirely
rewrote the Georgia Controlled Substance Forfeiture Law this year, e s8 resulting in changes in many areas, such as jurisdiction, procedures, notice,
time requirements, and distribution of proceeds.
B. D.U.I.
Jackson v. State 99 held that an alcohol test performed by a hospital
for purposes of treatment was admissible and not controlled by the Implied Consent Law.700 In Jackson the report was admitted pursuant to
the Code as a hospital business record. 01 However, one should be mindful
692. Id. at 841, 400 S.E.2d at 924.
693. Id. at 841-42, 400 S.E.2d at 924.
694. See, e.g., McJunkin v. State, 199 Ga. App. 353, 405 S.E.2d 110 (1991) (Judge Pope,
concurring, lists the many procedural variables recognized thus far, and cautions the defense

bar.)
695. 197 Ga. App. 619, 399 S.E.2d 88 (1990).
696. Id. at 622, 399 S.E.2d at 92.
697. Id. at 621, 399 S.E.2d at 91.
698. O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49 (Supp. 1991). There is a nonabatement clause in the Act, but it
is not codified. 1991 Ga. Laws 886.
699. 196 Ga. App. 724, 397 S.E.2d 13 (1990).
700. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-392(a) (1991).
701. O.C.G.A. §24-3-14(b) (1982) provides:
Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise,
made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event
shall be admissible in evidence in proof of the act, transaction, occurrence, or
event, if the trial judge shall find that it was made in the regular course of any
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that, arguably if the test is not performed under the Implied Consent
Law, it is doubtful as to whether the presumptions of intoxication
02
7

apply.

Finally, the General Assembly in 1991 added an "open container" law
which changed the statutory -presumption of .10 grams percent to .08
grams percent blood alcohol content and the per se violation blood alcohol content from .12 grams percent to .10 grams percent.7 0 8 A person

under the age of 18 is a per se violator if he drives with a blood alcohol
content of .06 grams percent or more.7T A vehicle seizure section was
added for habitual violators.705

business and that it was the regular course of such business to make the memorandum or record at the time of the act, transaction, occurrence, or event or
within a reasonable time thereafter.
Id.
702. O.C.G.A. § 40-6.392(b) (1991). See Patterson v. State, 224 Ga. 197, 199, 160 S.E.2d
815, 816-17 (1968).
703. O.C.G.A. §§ 40-6-253(b), -392(b)(3), -391(a)(4) (1991).
704. Id. § 40-6-391(k).
705. Id. § 40-6-391.2.

